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iIUTBODUOTIOS.
In 1750 there was a very marked and sharp distinction oe-
tween the charter governments of ilassachusc tts , khode Island and
Connecticut, tne proprietary governments of Pennsylvania, Delaware
and Llaryland, and the provincial governments of the seven other con-
tinental colonies. Each of the first group was provided with a chart-
er wnicli was substantially a written constitution which bound both
king and colonists ^nd could not he altered except by mutual consent,
jln the second group tnere was some person who stood between tne crown
and colonists and appointed tne governor, granted tne lands under a
iroyal charter as a constitution. The third group, had only for a con-
1
stitution, precedent, and tne governor's instructions.
In as much as tnere existed these three forms of government
among the American colonies it seems advisable to select from each
group , a type and describe tne executive's powers in that colony.
Of the seven royal provinces, Virginia presents tne best example of a
bypical provincial executive.
In 1619 when Virginia was given a legislative assembly -
-he first in America - the governor, assembly and council all sat to- !
2
gether as one body. Just how long tney continued to cooperate in tnis
nanner in unknown; out it is known that as early as 1631 the governor
pid council came into direct conflict with each other. Governor Harvey
?ho was tnen tne chief executive of Virginia complained tnat without
;he advice of tne council no could do nothing, and that tne casting oi
i vote was tne only power he had. On the other hand, however, the
--0--
1. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 41.
2. Ibid., 42.

2
1
council complained of the oppressive conduct of Harvey.
By 1689 the governor was olearly separated from the council
ana possessed considers bio power over it. Lvcn though he and the
council were separated from each other, there continued to De con-
siderable controversy over their exact relationship. It is clear,
tnough, tnat tne governor nad
,
by tnis time, occome tne central ex-
ecutive power in tne colony, but was checked in his exorcise by a
nominative council. "This system thus worked out in Virginia seems to
have oeen tne model for other royal provinces, and even to have in-
2
fluenced the proprietory governments to some extent."
From the time tnat Virginia beccrae a royal province in 1624,
down to the Revolutionary "ar, the executives received their rights
to govern from the Crown. They received tneir commissions tor terms
varying in length from a few years to terms for life, in the seven-
teenth century; hut the terms were at the king's pleasure in the
eighteenth century. The governor, after receiving his commission, al-
ways was presented with a set of instructions tnat frequently did not
?rant tne same powers tnat tne commissions did. For example, the com-
mission gave the governor power to act with a quorum of three council-
ors; out the instructions increased tne number for a quorum to five.
Che commissions gave him the right to erect new courts; but the in-
struct ions usually recuirea a warrant from the crown before such
4
courts could be erected.
The executive's appointive power in Virginia was quite ex-
tensive. As early as 1711, the assembly tried to make tne consent of
--0--
1. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 24.
2. Ibid., 25.
3. Instructions to Governor Dunmore, Sect. 6.
4. Ibid., Sect. 38.

the Council necessary Tor appointments by the governor, but it railed':
The Virginia council usually consisted of twelve members .appointed by
the crown on the governor's recommendation. In case the number or
councilors fell Delow seven it oecame the governor's privilege to
make provisional appointments; but the namos of all appointees must
2
be sent to tne crov/n ror sanction.
By 1727, not only did all the military officers receive
tneir appointments from tne governor, but nearly all tne civil officers
of importance. In addition to nis authority to appoint the military
officers, ne also occupied the position of commander- in-cnief of tne
military forces of tne colony, and nad tne power to demand tne mili-
tary services of its inhabitants, furthermore, "he was intrusted with
important responsibilities in connection with tne general military
operations of the crown in America." For instance, whon the French
and Indian war orolie cut, Governor .Dinwiddie was very active in the
handling of the Virginia troops in opposition to the enemy. Hot only
had the governor control over the land forces, but he was also cora-
4
:nissicned vice-admiral of the navy; but in as much as Virginia
possessed scarcely any navy this power was of little worth.
From the time of the first legislative assembly in 1619,
till the flight of Governor Dunnore in 1775, tne executive and assem-
bly opposed each other more or less. The instruction issued to imn-
Tiore in 1771, shows tnat ne was intended to possess very great con-
trol over tne colony. Aside from his control of tne council by means
Df nis appointing tne menbers of that body, he was given a cneck on
--o—
1. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 112.
2. Instructions to Governor Uunmore , oects. 7-10.
3. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 113.
4. Instructions to Governor Dunrnore, ->ect. 61.

4the assembly through the negativo or their legislation. He was not toj
assent tc lav/s providing ror an increase or decrease or the number or
members in tne assembly. Ilor v?as he to permit lav/s made ror snort
periods. Furthermore, nc ras not to allow appropriations except ror
the support or tne government. His instruction was to veto all en-
actments placing duties on British shippings or British manuractured
articles, and on negroes or felons imported into Virginia. It was his
duty, also, to disallow all acts favoring the establishment or con-
tinuation or lotteries.
In judicial matters, he was to appoint judges, with tne ad-
vice and consent or tne council, to erect courts, and to encourage
justice by allowing appeals rrom the courts or the comnon law to him
and even to tne King and Privy Council.
He had a distinct control over rinancial arrairs, in that
all warrants on the treasury had to be issued oy him, and rurthermore
,
by having his salary rixed at 2000 pounds per annum, payable rrom a
two shilling duty on exported tobacco. 2he Virginia executive was not
alone in having a salary not under control or the legislative body;
the Maryland and South Carolina governors enjoyed the same privileges.
Then, too, Governor Dunmore had the prorogation and disso-
lution power that all the colonial governors enjoyed. In addition to
these rights he was instructed to guard against rrauds, especially
1
jpitn respect to tne colonial opposition to the navigation Laws.
Although Massachusetts, Khode Island and Connecticut gov-
ernments were charter governments; yet Massachusetts diri'ered widely
from the other two charter colonies, in that its governor was not
--o—
1. See Instructions to Governor Lunmore , in Massachusetts Histor-
ical Society Collections, 4th Series, x. 660-seq.

6elective as \as the case in Ivhodc Island and Connecticut. This, then,
made the powers or the Liassachuse tts executive somewhat like tnose of
tne Virginia executive. In the first place the governor of ilassachu-
setts received nis office fron the crown with a commission ana in-
structions similar to tnose or the royal provinces. Then, too, ne nact
a council, out one tnat was chosen oy the General Court of Massachu-
setts, ana not appointed by the crown on the governor's recommenda-
tion as was true in Virginia. Furthermore, he was commander-in-cnief
Joi the military ana naval rorces, ana was intrustea with the welfare
|joi tne colony. The governor was
,
however, by the charter of 1691,
forbiaaen to take men out or tne colony without consent of tne Gen-
eral Court or witnout tneir own rrcc consent.
V/ith regara to appointments made by tne executive, tne
Massachusetts governor had the right, according to the 1691 charter,
to appoint judicial and military officers, but was not allowed to
select tr.e men ror tne important administrative positions. This priv-;
|ilege, tiie General Court enjoyed.
One right tnat the governor of Massachusetts as well as the
governor or Virginia enjoyed, was tnat of aissolution ana prorogation
1
of tne legislative ooay, a tning, too, wnich was rcsortca to very
frequently
.
The right of veto was anotner that tne Massachusetts gov-
ernor exercised in a greater way than dia the provincial governors.
Since the council was elected usually by tne general court, tne
(charter maae provision for tne governor to exercise the rignt of veto
over tnose chosen, if ne so acsirea. In 1692, this rignt was first
exercisea, when Governor Phips negativea a canaiaate who haa opposea
— o
—
1. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 152.

6nis appointment as governor. In 1703 , rive councilors were negatived;
ana again m 1741 ,tnirtecn met the same fate. This time the House re-
fused to fill »ne vacancies ana thus established a precedent tnat was I
1
followed oy several Houses. In 1705 ana 1720 , respectively , tne Massaf
chusetts speakers were vetoed oy tne governor. In tne latter case a
dispute arose; and the House refused to elect a new speaker. For this
tne governor aissolvea tnem. Tne disoutc, nowever, was finally ae-
2
ciaea against tne assembly oy tne socallea "explanatory" charter.
The assembly, from time to time, fougnt bitterly to restrain
the governor ana wrest some or nis powers from him. During Burnet's,
Belcher's ana Shirley's terms tnere was waged a battle over tne right
itaf tne assemDiy to fix tne governor's salary. The contest ended in
3
the victory of the assembly. At the close of tne French and Indian
war nis salary oecame entirely aepenaent on tne temporary, and fre-
quently, annual grants oi tne assembly. In this way, as in Virginia,
jlegislation was often cnecked; occause tne governor would aissolve or
'prorogue tne General Court; or tne assemoiy would refuse to pass laws
ana mane appropriations unless the gove:nor raaae concessions. For an
example of the controversy between -cne executive ana tne legislative
boay, we fina tnat in 1770 Governor Hutchinson refused an appropri-
ation ior salaries, and when asked for an explanation said: "Before
phe close of the present session I shall assent to, or reject the bills
[which shall have passed both Houses, as it shall appear to me the
Lame duty requires of me." In 1771 he again refused to accept appro-
priations. The reason for this the General Court were at a loss to
--o—
1. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 77.
2. Ibid., 150.
3. Ibid., 172.

7understand; but Hutchison informed thorn that it v/as not hi3"iila jesty ' s
1
pleasure that he do so."
Turning to the other two charter colonies, Rhode Island
and Connecticut, we find that as far back as 1647, Providence in-
structed its delegates to the Portsmouth assembly reserving to itself
full power to elect and control its own officers, to transact all its
town business, to try all cases exceot those reserved for the ooloni-
2
! al courts. It appears, too, that the governor and lieutenant-gov-
ernor had no seat in the legislature, and that the political power of
[the governor was seriously limited. He could, however, notifv the
3
Assembly of coming sessions, but could not negative their acts.
But in 1662 and 1663, when Charles II. granted to Connect!-
cut and Rhode Island new charters, he gave to them the best consti-
tutional form of government that existed in America. The documents
were so nearly alike that what may ue said of one will hold true in
the other. The Rhode Island charter provided for a governor, lieu-
tenant-governor, and ten assistants, to be elected from time to time
by the people. The governor, upon all occasions, had the right to
consult and advise the company regarding the business affairs of the
colony. Furthermore, the governor was a member of the general assem-
bly, six of whom with himself, constituted a quorum "to apoynt, alter
and change, such aayes, tymes and places of meeting and dene rail
Assemblye , as theye shall thinke ffitt." In addition to this the gov-
ernor with his assembly were to make lavs, rules and orders not con-
trary to the lavs of the realm; and he was to see that they were
"putt in execution."
--0--
1. Gushing, "History of the Transition from Province to Common-
wealth Government of Massachusetts ," in Columbia Uni. Studies, vii. 37-8
.
2. Osgood, "The American Colonies," i. 356.
I g. Ibid.. 1. 385. 360.
|

8In military affairs, the governor with the major part of
his assistants, when the assembly was not in session, were empowered
military officers necessary for the "trayneing upp the inhabitants"
1
for the defence and safeguard of the colony.
The baokwardneaa of Rhode Island in matters of salary for
the governor is illustrated by a vote of the .assembly in 1698. "This
Asseraoly having considered the great charge and expense that our Hon-
f
ored Governor is daily at on the Colony's concerns, have enacted
....that tJiere snail De added to the Governor's sallary the sura of
twenty pounds per annum, so that the whole sum shall be thirty pounds,
2
to be paid out of tiie General Treasury upon demand."
7,'e have, therefore, in these two colonies the only examples
among the American colonies of a free elective system, whereby the
executives were to be chosen by their number, from their number and
subject to the will of their number. Such powers as the charters gave
the executives weie still maintained until the break of the Americans
from the mother country.
In Maryland and Pennsylvania, we have a radical departure
from the royal and elective executives. The King established the pro- '
prietary form of colony by delegating to the proprietor the right to
exercise certain functions of the prerogative within the province.
In the early time, the governor was the proprietor's agent Tor all
purposes of government. He was the center "from whom radiated tne
*-
nilitary, judicial and administrative activity." He received, in
addition to the cnarter rigftts, commissions and instructions giving
--0--
1. Rhode Island Charter of 166^
.
2. Hhode Island He cords, iii. £45.
3. Osgood, "The American Colonies," ii. 62.

9him full military power, and the right to prorogue and dissolve assem-
1
blies. These were, nowevcr, not as extensive powers as tho pro-
prietors had; Tor they could, in addition to all rights which they
gave to their s-overnors
,
punish and pardon, bestow titles of honor
2
and found churches, nil these powers made the proprietor the real
executive of the province. In Maryland, he even claimed the right to
originate laws, a oower that Penn gave to his governor and council
3
in his first two charters. Charles Calvert probably gaurded his pre-
rogative more jealously and sought to extend it by skillful manage-
ment, more than any other Maryland Proprietor. He had filled the upper
house with his relatives who were of his opinions. He had checked tne
lower house by reducing its members so that he could more easily
coerce it into submission. "His methods of government were dynastic,
4
and chiefly on that narrow basis his control over the province rested.
In the ecrly history of iJaryland the governor and council
constituted the nighest court of appeals; and until 1661, the govern-
or enjoyed the right of acting as chancellor for the colony. In 1684,
the admiralty jurisdiction wa3 taken away from the governor and his
associates in the provincial court; but they still retained the judi-
5
jial function of high court of appeals.
In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, the governor and council,
enjoyed less prominence in judicial affairs* In 1604, an act was pass-
id which provided that the governor should appoint five judges, any
6
|hree of whom, should constitute tne provincial court. Although x'enn
1. In Pennsylvania the governor could not prorogue or dissolve
assemblies. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 151.
2. Osgood, "The American Colonies," ii. 59.
3. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 40.
4. Osgood, "The American Colonies," ii. 485.
5. Ibid., 277-279.
6. Ibid.. £81.
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by his first and second frames of government provided that the gov-
ernor and council might establish courts; yet the assembly soon be-
gan to legislate concerning the establishment of courts and the
1
appointment of judges, thus wresting power from the executive. Hot
only did the governor lose power in this respect, but he also failed
to retain the rights that Penn gave him in 1701. In this instance the;
governor was vested with the right to fill all vacancies that might
2
arise, and to increase the number of councilors if need be. In appearj-
ance, this gave the governor greater control of the constitution of
the council; but later the council gained "an important part in the
2
admission of new raembeis."
With regard to the right of veto, both the Pennsylvania and
the Maryland governors were denied the exercise of a negative on leg-
4
islation. At the very outset it was the intention of Lord Baltimore
to control proceedings of nis legislature not only by his right of
appointing and instructing the governor and council, but also by ex-
5
ercising the veto power, himself. Ehis right remained, too, in the
hands of the proprietor until the close of the English control over
6
the colonies, and was cited as one of the causes of the Revolution.
In the matter of appropriations for salaries of the governo^r,
the Maryland executive had a decided independence from the legislative
Dody, in that there was a oermanent grant made to the crown and pro-
7
prietor for support of the provincial governor. It seems tnat in
--0--
1. Osgood, "The American Colonies, " ii. 281.
2. The assemble and council in Pennsylvania were elected annually
Until the granting of the Charter Privileges in 1701, from wnich time
only tne assembly-men were chosen each year.
3. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 75.
4. Ibid., 1£.
5. Osgood, "The American Colonies," 281.
6. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 14.
7. Ibid., 59.

11
Pennsylvania, though, the governor was dependent upon the assembly;
for it was a common practice for the speaker of the assembly to issue'
1
orders upon the treasury for the payment of money.
In conclusion, then, we find that the provincial, proprie-
tory and the Massachusetts charter executives received their office
by appointments, and power by commissions and instructions; out that
tne charter colonies of Ehode Island and Connecticut annually electedj
their governors whose authority was found in the charters. In the
matter of veto, all exercised that right, except the Ehode Island and
Connecticut executives. 7/e find, also, that in Virginia and Maryland
the governors were independent of the legislatures for their salaries;
but that in the charter colonics and Pennsylvania the assemblies
managed the purse strings when it came to paying the chief magis-
trates. Furthermore , it is seen that Maryland and Virginia had
appointive councils while Massachusetts, Ehode Island and Connecticut
chose theirs by annual elections.
--0--
1. Greene, "The Provincial Governor," 101.
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CEtPTEB I.
THE OF THE COIISTITUTIOiiS
.
When the Virginia legislature in Mfty
,
1774, heard of the
passage of the Boston Port Bill, it resolved that the day on which
the law went into efrect should be one of "fasting, humiliation, and
prayer". In consequence, the governor of the colony dissolved the
legislature. His action aroused the members to such an extent that
they met and instructed a committee to correspond with the other col-
onies on the expediency of holding a general congress of delegates.
During the same month the citizens of Baltimore, in a town meeting,
recommended that "a general congress of deputies from all the counties"
of the colony meet in Annapolis; and in responce to this recommenda-
tion ninety-two delegates were chosen to meet in a convention June
22. Immediately upon assembling, the convention advised that a congress
of deputies trom all the colonies meet at some early date for the
1
purpose of discussing the condition and welfare of the colonies. As
a result of the recommendations of Virginia and of Maryland, fifty-
five delegates representing every colony except Georgia, met as the
First Continental Congress in Philadelphia, oeptemoer 5, 1774. This
convention was followed May 10, 1775, by the Second Continental
Congress
.
This general Congress resolvea December 4,1775, "that
Virginia call a convention and establish such forms of government
that will best produce the happiness of the people". The convention,
then assembled, received the resolutions December 12 , but took no
action. In April, 1776, were elected delegates for a new convention,
1. Browne, "The History of a x^alatinate" , 261.
2. Ford, "The Writings of Thomas Jefferson", ii. 8.

1 2
the fifth and last .which met iilay 6. It was not called for the
express purpose of adopting a constitution; out on uiay 15, it ap-
pointed a committee to draw up a Dill of rights and prepare a plan
of government. Congress had, nowever, already adopted on May 10,1776,
the resolution "That it be recommended to the respective assemblies
and conventions of the United Colonies, where no Government sufficient
to the exegencies of their affairs had oeen hitherto established,
to adopt such government, as shall, in the opinion of the representa-
tives of the people, uest conduce to the happiness and safety of
their constituents in particular, and America in general." Almost
simultaneously with the receipt of the resolution from Congress, two
plans of government were submitted to the Virginia convention.
Jefferson, although he had urged Randolph to oppose measures leading
to a permanent frame of government, until the people could elect
delegates for that ourpose, finally submitted a draft, the bill of
rights of which was adopted with little change. The plan before the
j
committee was the famous one that hichard Henry x»ee had received
from John ^dams in liovember of 1775. Lee and Adams were warm friends
!,and had had some correspondence on matters pertaining to government;
and in reply to Lee's request for suggestions on a plan.^dams had
[written as follows:
"To Aichard Henry Lee,
Philadelphia, 15Kov., 1775.
"Dear Sir,- The course of events naturally turns the thoughts of
gentlemen to the subjects of legislation and jurisprudence; and it iJ
--0--
1. Kowland, "The Life of Soerge .4ason", i. 222.
2. Ford, "The Writings of Thomas Jefferson", ii. 8.
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a curious problem, what lorra of government is most readily and easily:
adopted Dy a colony upon a sudden emergency, ilature and experience
lhave already pointed out the solution of this problem, in the choice
of conventions and committees of safety. Uothing is wanted, in addi-
tion, to these, to make a complete government, but the appointment
of magistrates for the due administration of justice.
"Taking nature and experience for ray guide, I have made
the following sketch, which may De varied in any one particular an
(infinite number of ways, so as to accomodate it to the different
|genious
,
Lemper, principles and even prejudices, of different people.
"A legislctive, an executive, and judicial power compre-
hend tne wnole of what is meant and understood by government. It is
iby Dalancing each of these powers against the other two, that the
efforts in human nature towards tyranny can alone De checked and re-
strained, and any degree of freedom preserved in the constitution.
"Let a full and free representation of the people be chosen:
for the house of commons.
"Let the house choose, Dy Dallot, twelve, sixteen, twenty-
Ifour, or twenty-eight persons, either members of the nouse , or from
I the people at large, as "cne electors please, for a council.
"Let the nouse and council, Dy joint Dallot, choose a gov-
'iernor, annually, triennially, or septennially , as you will.
"Let the governor, council, and house, be each a distinct
and independent branch of tne legislature, and have a negative on
itne laws.
"Let the governor, secretary, treasurer, commissary, attor-
ney-general , and solictor-general , be chosen annually, by joint bal-
|lot or Doth nouses.
"Let tne governor, with seven counselors , be a quorum.

15
".jet all officers and magistrates, civil and military, De
nominated and appointed Dy the governor, Dy and with the advice and
consent 01 nis council.
"Let no orficers oe appointed Dut at a general council; and!
let notice oe given to all counselors seven days at least Defore a
general council.
"Let the judges, at least, or tne supreme court, oe incapac-
itated oy lav/ iron holding any snare in tne legislative or executive
power; let tfieir commissions De good behavior, and their salaries
ascertained and estaDlished Dy law.
T
'Let the governor nave the command of the army, the militia
rorts, etc.
"^et the colony have a seal, and affix it to all commissions
"In this way a single month is sufficient, without tne least
convulsion, or even animosity, to accomplish a total revolution in
the government of a colony. If it is thought more Deneficial, a
law may De made, Dy tneir new legislature, leaving to the people at
l|large tDe privilege of choosing their governor, and counselors annu-
ally, as socn as affairs get into a more (;uiet course.
"In adopting a plan in some respects similar to this, human
nature wouia appear in its proper glory, asserting its own real dig-
j
pity, pulling down tyrannies at a single exertion, and erecting sucn
jjnew ra Dries ss it tninks Dest calculated to promote its nappiness.
"As you were last evening polite enough to asK me for tnis
moael, it sucn a triiie will De or any service to you or any gratifi-
cation or curiosity, here you have it, Sir*
"From your friend and humble servant,
1
John iidams"
.
-
-o--
1. C.Fi iidams, "The Works of John Adams", 185-186.
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That the Adams plan we 3 in the hands of the committee whist
was drafting the Virginia constitution, is questioned very vigorously
by Kate liason Rowland, the biographer of Ueorge Mason, to whom she
attributes very largely the authorship of the document, it is cer-
tain, however, that the ideas expressed by Adams are, in the main,
those embodied in all the original constitutions of the states. In
Virginia, at this tine, there was a faction who symapthised with
the general opposition to the British rule as it had been exercised
over the colonies, Dut ravored an aristocratic form of government.
They admitted that a government should have for its object the se-
curing of happiness for every member of society, yet denied that it
was practical to base government on public virtue. They lauded
the British Constitution of 1689, and pronounced democratic govern-
ments "inimical to elegance and refinement, to manufactures, arts,
1
and sciences and to the accumulation of wealth". They proposed a
nouse of representative?, cnosen oy the people tor three years, these
j
to select from tne colony at large twenty-four persons as a council
;Of state who should nold 'heir places for life. They recommended a
governor, elected by the assembly with a tenure of office for life
or during good behavior, and impeachable by both nouses. He was
to nave a privy council as an advisory board who were not to be
members of either House. He was to appoint the Military and other
inferior civil orficers ; and with the advice and consent of the privy1
2
council was to appoint judges.
With the Jefferson, the ixaams and the aristocratic plans
in the nands of at least some of the members of the convention,
a
1.Henry , "Life .Correspondence and speeches of Patrick Henry"
,
i.42,1.
2. Ibid., i. 421.
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constitution was adopted June 29, 1776, and immediately put into effec
without having been submitted to the people ror ratification.During
the same time Hew .Jersey delegates were in convention and adopted a
constitution without the people's sanction, two days oefore the
Declaration or Independence. In the same year Delaware followed Sep-
tember 21; Pennsylvania, September 28; Maryland, November 11; and
Horth Carolina, December 18,with new forms of government. Georgia
waited less than two months longer and brought forward a plan of
government on February t> , 1777 A little more than two months later
£?ew York, in the same convention thet met to ratify the Declaration
of Independence, rollowed with a constitution on April 20. Pennsyl-
vania had been accustomed to a legislative body that consisted of
dug house; and framed, a constitution in harmony with the system al-
ready in vogue. In South Carolina a temporary plan of government
fvas put into operation on lilarch 26, 1776, "till an accommodation of
the unhappy differences between Great Britain and America"c ould be
1
potained. The circumstances were peculiar here, in that the pop-
Illation v/as a "medley of different nations and composed of the most
2
contradictory characters". It had doubled in ten years and was much
opposed to any form of government that might in any way prevent a
reconciliation between the colonies and Great Britain. This feeling
It was that prevented a premanent constitution until Liarch 19,1778,
when, though opposed by a strong party that included Hawlins Lowndes
£na Governor Kutledge, a plan was agreed upon which went into effect
in November of the same year.
The situation in Liassachusetts was very different from that
--0--
1. McCrady,"The History of South Carolina, 1775-178C", 116.
2. Frothingnam, "The Rise of the Republic" , 496.

in any of the southern or middle colonies. This state had fallen
back on her old charter as a basis of government and had been .try-
ing to draw up for adoption some acceptable form of government since
September, 1776, out was not successful until niarch 2, 1780. That un-
yielding attitude that the Massachusetts colonists manifested during
the few years preceding the Revolution was showing itself in their
endeavor to adopt a constitution. When the assembly met in the fall
of 1776 to frame some form of government, one of their greatest
difficulties was in determining a "free and adequate representation".
1
Their willingness to compromise caused the first attempt to go on
record as a failure. The legislature of 1777, however, "appointed
a committee of the legislature to draft a form of constitution which
was reported January, I77y, and when submitted to the people, was
rejected by a great majority on the grounds that it did not emanate
2
from the delegates elected for that specific purpose." It contained
no bill of rights, and the executive power was not satisfactorily
2
adjusted. Because of the enemy's presence in Uewport, Massachusetts
was called upon to send assistance to Khode Island. This emergency
necessitated a delay for another year before any attempt was made
to plan another form of constitution. Hear the close of 1779, nowever,
delegates were chosen for a constitutional convention. They met, and
after a careful consideration submitted a plan to the people, which
after some slight amendments was accepted, and put into effect March
2, 1730. The knowledge gained from the unsuccessful attempt to frame
a suitable form of government and rrom seeing those of other states
in operation, had enabled iiassachuse tts to give to her people what
--0--
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was probably tne Dest or tne early state constitutions.
The only state that had not a permanent constitution in
operation at tne close of the struggle with England, aside from
IConnecticut and Rhode Island which were content with their charters
for 1662 and 1663, was New Hampshire. This state had not been without
1
some provisional government; for on January t>, 1776, it had led all
the other colonies oy adopting a temporary constituion. The isolated
geographical situation of Kew Hampshire enabled it to pass through
the war with this temporary plan, until June 2, 1784, when the
permanent constitution adopted Cctober 31, 1732, went into effect.
--0--
1. Belknap, "History of New Hampshire," ii. 4C0. In December,
1775, a new convention met ana agreed to draw up a form of govern-
ment. The legislature of its own accord, in January, 1776, selected
!jtwelve of its own members to sit in a separate body. Thus arose the
two houses. In their hurry they provided for no executive and ex-
perienced tha"G right themselves.

CHaPTEK II.
THE LEGISLATURES
1
John Adams, in nis "Thoughts on Government" to i.ichard
Henry Lee says:
•1. a single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies
and frailties or an individual; subject to Tits of humor, starts of
passion, flights or enthusiasm, partialities, or predjudice, and
I consequently productive of nasty results and absurd judgments, and
all tnese errors ougnt to be corrected and defects supplied oy some
controlling porer.
"2. A single assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time
, will not scruple to exert itself from burdens, which it will lay,
without compunction on its constituents.
"2. A single assembly is apt to grew ambitious, and after
2
I
a time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one
I fault of the. Long Parliament, but more remarkably of Holland, whose
assembly first voted themselves from annual to septennial, tnen for
life, and after a course of years, tnat all vacancies happening by
death, or otherwise, should be filled by themselves, witnout any
application to constituents at all.
"4. A representative assembly, although extremely well
qualified, and absolutely necessary, as a branch of the legislative,!
is unfit to exercise tne executive power, for want of two essential
properties, secrecy and dispatch.
--0--
1. C. F. Adams, "The ?.orks of John ^dams," iv. 195-196.
2. The members of the Pennsylvania Assembly had not been attend-
ing according to the requirements of the constitution, nor when call-
j;
ed by tne Supreme Executive Council. Consequently, on September 20,
j
1782, an act was passed to fine all negligent members fifteen pounds
and the cost of tne suit, except those who had given fifteen days
notice tnat tney would not attend.
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"5. A representative assembly, is still less qualified tor
the judicial power, because it is too numerous, too slow and too
little skilled in the laws.
"6. 3eoause a single assembly, possessed or all the powers
of government, would make aroitrary laws for their own interest,
execute all laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and judge all
controversies in their own favor."
The influence that John ixdams had upon the colonies at
the time they were framing their constitutions was probably greater
1
than he ever realized; for with but one exception, the scheme that
he formulated was mainly followed in every state constitution, as
tne following outline shows:
State Name o f ^ [Uo • of
"body houses
r
..
Hame How
-1
elected Term Qualifications
_iSenate ! by
—g-
people 1 yr. prop. 7 yrs. res.
K.H. Gen. Court two fO yrs. old, pro
t
K.cf R»
j
.
.
• • prop
.
, 2 yrs
.
res
.
,prot
.
Senate '• . • « prop. ,5 yrs. res
Mass
.
Sen. Court two t
H« of R.
i
. .. prop
.
, 1 yr .res
.
Senate 4 yrs .property ,res
H.Y. Legislature two
Assembly; . 1 yr. property , res
^eg . Coun. . • • property, 1 yr.
E.J. Legislature two residence
Gen.Assy . . • • property, 1 yr.
residence
Pa. Assembly one •H.of h. . prop. ,2 yrs. res
( only 4 yrs.
in 7. )
--0—
1. Under the proprietary government, Pennsylvania had had but
one house in the legislature, and it kept the precedent.
2. In each state me executive and judicial departments were
entirely separate from the legislative department.
2. The suffrage under the Koyal government of Eorth Carolina
had been granted to all male inhabitants; but under the guidance of
the provincial congress it was restricted to freeholders. "Johns
Hopkins University Studies," xvi. t>26.
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State i:arae of Jfo.of Name How elected fn . ^ ....icrm Oil A*1 \ -pi r*fii~*\ nn qV^Ucil i. X 1 v J- J. 11
b ody houses
-
,
-
1
Council by people yrs jprop. ,rcs
.
,25
Del
.
Gen.AssemDij two yrs .old.
h . r . «
•
1 yr. property ,res
.
oena be by eleotors 5 yrsjprop.,£ yrs. res
Md
.
3en.Assembly two
H.of Bel » people 1 yr. prop. ,1 yr.res
.
oena ce » • • 4 yrs Jprop. ,res
.
,
v a Gen •Asseraolj two 25 yrs. old.
H.of Del 1 yr. property , res
O MM M 4- Abena te • • 1 yr. property, res.
i.e. Gen.Assembly two
H.of Coe • • • • 1 yr. property, res.
x»eg • Goun Gen. A
.
1 yr.
b . C .1 ( (b Gen.Assembly two
uen. a. • • people 1 yr.
benat
e
• • 1 yr. prop. ,1 yr.res.
b . U . 1 / (0 Gen .Assembly two .protestant
.
xi • 1 rv
.
• • 1 yr. prop. ,1 yr.res.
jprotestant
oena ue 1 • • • •7 yrs.jprop., £ yrs. in
Ga. Gen.Assembly two U.S
.
,3yrs . in st
|28 yrs. old.
H.of R. • * 1 yr. prop
.
, 7 yrs . in
U.S. , res. of st.

CHAPTER III.
THE EXECUTIVE.
1. The Earliest Forms after 1774 .
It ought ever to be Dome in mind tnat when the Declaration
of Independence was draited, no Royal Governor had the least authority
over any of the colonies, and that no 3ritish troops had any footing
on this continent. The country was then absolutely our own. It is
true a formidable force was collected on our coast ready to invade
1
us; ana in view of these conditions, forms of government were tnrust
upon tne states. Each of the states in framing its constitution saw
tne need of an executive entirely separate from tne legislative and
judicial Doaies; for "If there is one truth to be collected from tne
nistory of all ages, it is this; that the people's rights and iiber-
ties, ana tne democratical mixture in a constitution, can never oe
preserved witnout a strong executive, or, in other words, without
separating the executive from the legislative power. If the executive
power, or any considerable part of it, is left in the hands either
of an aristocratical or democratical assembly, it will corrupt the
legislature as necessarily as rust corrupts iron, or as arsenic
poisons the human body; and when the legislature is corrupted the
people are undone." The truth of Adams's philosophy has never been
successfully questioned; yet the majority of the colonies were left
no other alternative , when the Royal Governors either fled from or
were forced out of office, than to allow the legislative bodies to
act as executive bodies.
In most of the colonies the government was managed by
--0--
1. Belknap, "History of Hew Hampshire ," ii. 405.
2. C.F. Adams, "The Works of John Adams," iv. £90.
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[conventions, called to make and administer tne laws untii tne Dreaon
oetween America and the mother country could be bridged over. Vir-
ginia ana Massacnusetts have disputed over which state took tne
('initiative m tnis matter. Bancroft denies that Virginia was tne
first to conduct a government against the king, saying that tne
council toou: cnarge of -cne government on July 19, 1775. On the other
hand, it is claimed that Virginia took charge of ner governmental
affairs July IV, of that same year, just two days previous to tne
1
action of Massacnusetts . In Massachusetts, where the council ex-
ercised the rignt of the executive, the committees of safety and
committees of correspondence were made much use of in disarming tne
2
unfriendly and keeping a watonful eye upon tnem. Cn Ivlay l, 1?76,
a declaration of allegiance was arawn up ana placed in tne nanas
of the committees of correspondence in every town and place in the
colony. This declaration was to De presented to every male inhabitant
above the age of sixteen to oe signed within twenty- four hours* All
wno refused were arrested and brougnt before a justice of the peace
to snow reasons why they refused to sign; and if sufficient reasons
were not given, tney were arrested, ana aisarmed ana tneir premises
searched for arms anu ammunitions «I!hey were aiso aisqualified from
holding any ofiiue in tne colony ana from exercising the rignt of
U
ii
franonise
.
In ITew Hampsnire, tne convention which met at Kxeter, Uay,
irVy, and continued in session till Eovember of the same year ,appoint-
-
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1. Rowland, "The Life of George Mason"
,
i, 264.
2. "The Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts" ,v. 479.
5. Ibid., v. 479.

ed a committee of safety with instructions similar to those given by
the Romans to their Dictator--"to take under consideration all mat-
ters in which the welfare of the province in the security of their
rights, is concerned; ana to take the utmost care that the public
1
sustain no damage." They were considered the supreme magistrate. In
2
Pennsylvania a council of safety nad power almost as nearly supreme.
Maryland was even more extreme. The Annapolis convention of June 22,
1774, (see p. 12 ) met again on July 26, and passed resolutions pro-
viding for a council oi safety. This convention was bound by nothing,
not even tne Continental Congress, except in so far as it pleased to
2
assent. In theory it was as despotic as the French convention of
4
1798.
In the case of Khode Island, the treatment of tne last
Governor under English control was not greatly unlike tnat in Mary-
land, in that although he was no longer allowed to serve in tne
capacity of chief executive, he was given perfect liberty. In the
I -o-
J
1. Belknap, "History of Kew Hampshire" , ii. £95.
2. "Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania", ix. 11.
S. Brown, "The History of a Palatinate", 271 & 274.
4. 1 bid. 27 Y. Congress armed and commissioned several small
vessels for tne defenceof Maryland. The convention did tne same thing
for her own colony. One of tne former intercepted a correspondence
between Governor Eden of Maryland and the British ministry relating
to tne assistance to be furnished by Eden in military operations soon
to be undertaken. The correspondence was sent to Congress and Eden
was ordered to be arrested. Mr. Purvaince , who was to arrest him,
forget to get consent from tne Convention to do so. The Council of
Safety foroade tne arrest to be made. Congress passed a resolution
tnat Eden should be arrested, to which the Council replied witn po-
lite intimation tnat Congress was over-stepping its power and that
they chose to manage their own affairs in their own way. They accept-
ed from Eden a promise that he would await tne meeting oi tne Con-
vention, and left nim, for tne time, unmolested. The Convention met
and approved the action of the Council of Safety, and Eden was
notified that he was at full liberty to depart with all his effects.
Virginia took it upon herself to remonstrate, upon which she was
sharply snubbed and told to mind her own business.

liay session or 17Yb, Governor Wanton' e sympathy towards England was
shown by his advising the colony not to mix in tne quarrel witn tne
motner country. Even after these suggestions, ne was reelected, out
could, not ta&e tne oath because of illness. Within two days , ne made
clear nis attitude towards England "by refusing to commission the
1
officers of the colonial troops already voted. As a result of nis
action ne was not allowed, when ne did regain nis nealth to take tne
oatn of office; and all acts done by him in the pretended capacity
of governor were declared null and void until such time as he should
be willing to grant tneir requests and take tne oatn with that idea
in view. In the June session tne assembly voted "that the said Joseph
2
Tanton nath not given satisfaction to the assembly," and continued.
to deny t;o nim tne oath. In the October session of the same year the
assembly deoiared governor Wanton inimical to the government and nis
office vacant . In tne following February the charter and such other
of zhe colony's legal papers as ne possessed were required of him;
and ne was brought before tne assembly for examination, but dismissed,
4
no reason being found ror detaining nim.
In lorth Carolina, after the flight of Governor idartin in
May, lWo, Provincial Congresses continued to meet. A Provincial
Council of tnirteen members was provided and given full executive
ana administrative power at all times, and supreme power while the
Provincial Congress was not in session. This system continued for
a few months only, nowever, wnen tnere was formed a new temporary
government wnich did away witn -cne Provincial Council ana zne aistrict
--0--
1. "Rhode Island Records", vii.££3.
2. Ibid., vii. Z26.
Z, Ibid., vii. 4t>2.
4. Ibid. , vii. 4b0.
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[committees or safety that Had been in use, and substituted in their
stead a Council of Safety for the whole state. This was to be a
1
permanent, supreme executive body.
In Georgia, the situation was very similar. A Council of
Safety took charge of affairs, arrested Governor "right in January,
177b, which act caused the Provincial Congress to meet, two days
later, on January £0. At once they began to plan for the "ground
2
work of a more stable and formal government."
Such then were tne conditions when tne Declaration of In-
dependence was adopted and the various states began to frame con-
stitutions .
2. The Keed of an Executive and the Methods of Choosing Him
The arbitrary rule of the royal governors had caused the
framers of tne state constitutions to consider the office of tne ex-
ecutive witn great suspicion, and to grant, in most cases, as little
power to him as they deemed consistent with the dignity of the office
That there was, nowever, a need of a strong administrative system
in the time of tne RevolutionjLs most vividly shown in the address
of the Massachusetts convention to the people of that state, in pre-
senting the constitution of 1780 for ratification. "The governor is
3
emphatically tne representative of the whole people, being cnosen,
not by one town or county, out by the people at large. T7e have, there-
fore, thought it safest to rest this power in his hands, and, as the
safety of the commonwealth requires that there should be one command-
er-in-chief over the militia, we nave given the governor that
--0--
1. Sikes, "The Transition of Ilorth Carolina from Colony to
Commonwealth, "in "The Johns Hopkins University studies," xvi. 5Z7.
2. Jones, "The History of Georgia," 211-212.
2. The Bill of Eights in all the State Constitutions declare for
an executive.
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command, for the same reason that we thought him the only proper per-
Son that could be trusted, with the vower of revising the bills and
resolves of the General Assembly; but the people may, if they please,
choose their own officers. To prevent the governor from abusing the
power which is necessary to be put into his hands, we have provided
that he shall have a Council to advise him at all times, and upon all
important occasions, and he, with the advice of the council, is to
1
have the appointment of civil officers." Although none of the other
states, at the time of the adoption of their constitutions J^nao ex-
pressed to the same extent the need of a strong executive department
frs did Massachusetts when it gave the governor the real rule of tne
state, yet practically all realized this one great weakness before
the close of the war; for there were but few states that did not nave
new forms of government before the close of the century. Even Massa-
Chusetts evidently aid not see at first the importance of a powerful
aead of the state; for in tne rejected constitution of 1778 he was
tampered in much the same way as were those of the other states.
2
notwithstanding the fact that Massachusetts provided for
|i popular election of its chief magistrate, the precedent had long
Deen established by the Massachusetts charter of 16E9 and by the Con-
aecticut and Khode Island charters of 1662 and 1663, and even by the
Jew York constitution of 1777. Bew Hampshire had no chief executive
--0--
1. "Journals of the Massachusetts Convention," 219.
2. In the rejected constitution of 1778 of Massachusetts, provi-
sion was made for electing the governor by the joint ballot of both
houses of the General Court.
3. In Hew lork an experiment was tried regarding the voting, it
was the feeling that voting by ballot was better than voting oy viva
voca; but to test it the matter was left open, so that voting by viva
voca'was to be used until a law should be passed making the method by
ballot. The first act was March 27, 1778, when a law was passed to
elect the governor by ballot. The Senate and Assembly were still elec
ed by viva voca until February 13, 1787, when an act was passed to^
elect these by ballot. Poore, "Charters and Constitutions," ii. 1333.
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until 1V«4, oefore which time the legislature exercised the executive
pover for the state, although the president or the council was given
consiaeraole autnority. "hen tne permanent constitution of 17bJZ v/ent
1
into effect, nowever, a President was elected Dy the people at large.
In Pennsylvania the choice of the president was vested in the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Council; and in all the other states the gov-
ernors were elected dv tne joint ballot of Doth houses of the leg-
2
islature
.
3. Tenure of Office .
In his plan of government, John Adams suggested, that the
executive De elected for one, three or seven years. The royal gov-
ernors nad Deen appointed for terms varying in length from one year
to life; and tne Rhode Island and Connecticut charters stipulated
that the executives should oe elected, yearly. TCith these precedents
«
of long and snort terras oefore them, the majority of the states
provided that tne governor, or president be elected annually. Vir-
4 b
ginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, however, placed a limitation of
three successive terms that the executive might serve, and not again
7
until after a lapse oi four years. Uorth Carolina limited the tenure
to three years in six; and Georgia, to one year out of three. South
QCarolina, the ninth state to adopt a constitution fixed the term of
-
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1. In all the states only those men could vote who were of a
specified age and freeholders.
2. Hot until Jackson's time were all the governors throughout
the Union elected Dy the people.
5. New Hampshire, Hew Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
Eorth Carolina, i.Iassacnusetts and Georgia elected executives annually.
4. Constitution of Virginia, Art. vii.
b. Constitution of Maryland, Art. xxxi.
6. Constitution of Pennsylvania,Art . 19.
7. Constitution of Korth Carolina, Art. xv.
8. Constitution of South Carolina, Art. iii.

of office at two years with a condition that the governor should not
again serve in that capacity until after rour years. In Delaware and
ITew York the tenure of office was extended to three years; and in
the former state the governor became ineligible for a second term un-
til the expiration of three years. The shortness of the term and the
limitations of the number of terms which a governor was allowed to
serve, are evidences of the distrust the people had of executives.
From tne very fact that Uew Hampshire, inlassachuse tts and Hew Jersey
constitutions were the only ones that did not name the number of
terms that the chief magistrate might serve, it looks as if the
aristocratic idea of having the governor serve for life, in general
met witn disfavor.
4. Qualifications
.
Should any state constitutional convention adopt a form of
government at the present time without placing in it a minimum age
limit and a minimum residence in the state as two of the qualifica-
tions for the office of governor, that part of the convention's work
would most likely De rejected. But only four of the first states
stipulated anything regarding the age of their governors. In Mary-
1 2
land he had to be at least twenty- five years old, in Uew Hampshire
2
e could not be under thirty; and in Uorth Carolina not under thirty
4
six. Georgia required that the executive reside in the state at
2 1
least three years before election; llorth Carolina and l.laryland
--0--
1. Constitution of Ldaryland, Art. xxx.
2. Constitution of Kew Hampshire, Poore's Charters and Con-
stitutions, ii. 1237.
2. Constitution of North Carolina, Art. xv.
•4. Constitution of Georgia, Art. xxiv.
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required five j ears ; New Hampshire and ^lassachusetts , seven years;
2
and South Carolina ten years.
The English idea that a freehold was one of the qualifi-
cations for the right of franchise and for the right of holding
office, was as deeply imbedded in tne minds of tne Americana as was
the principle, which the early colonists nad Drought with tnera from
the mother country, that an office nolder must be a Christian, rrith
the belief that a man who was a property holder would make a better
executive and exercise greater interest in the welfare of tne state
tnat elected nira, and of the United states in general, each of the
eleven states tnat framed constitutions stipulated tnat its governor,
or president, and tne council must be free holders. Hew Hampshire
'demanded tnat its presiaent possess property to tne value of 500
»7
«^
pounds, one naif of which must oe a freehold, -iassachuset ts , in the
rejected constitution of 1778, and in the one adopted in 178C,
prescribed that the governor own an estate of at least 1CCC pounds
in valuation, and the lieutenant-governor possess above 500 pounds
4
p.n land tenements. In Maryland the valuation of the governor's
property must not oe below &C0C pounds, 1CC0 pounds of which was to
XJ
be a freehold estate. In Eorth Carolina, tne minimum worth of the
6
executive's estate was to be 10CC pounds; but in South Carolina,
7
tne figures were raised to 10000 pounds. One must not be misled,
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1. In the Massachusetts rejected constitution of 1770, the
governor must not be an Indian, negro, or mulatto, must be a tax
payer, and twenty-one years old; and he must have lived one year in
the town from wnicn ne was elected.
2. Constitution of South Carolina, Art. v.
3. Constitution of Eew Hampshire, in Poore's Charters, 1287.
4. Constitution of Massachusetts , Part ii.. Chap, ii.. Sect, i.,
Art. ii.
5. Constitution of Maryland, Art. xxx.
b. Constitution of ITorth Carolina, ^.rt . xv.
7. Constitution of South Carolina, Art. v.

however, by this very large property quali fication in oouth Carolina;
because, when this state adopted its constitution, Uarch, 177t3, the
1 2 2
continental currency in L'orth Carolina, Virginia and Pennsy lvania
had depreciated from three and three- fourths to five times its origi-
nal value. Then, too, the bills of credit issued by the different
states vere not discounted at the same rate, another peculiar quali-
fication required of the South Carolina governor was, he should be a
protestant, as were the governors of the majority of the states; but,
during the two years next preceding his election, he should not have
been a minister, preacher or religious teacher.
5. Oath.
Hot all of the constitutions provided an oath for their
executives. Virginia neglected to do so; but the constitutional con-
vention, before adjourning, passed a resolution that the governor
take the following oath: "I, A.B., elected governor of Virginia
by the representatives thereof, do solemnly promise and swear that
I will, to the best of my skill and judgment, execute the said office
diligently and faithfully, according to law without favor, affection
or partiality; and that I will, to the utmost of ray power, support,
maintain, and defend, the commonwealth of Virginia, and the consti-
tution of the same, and protect the people thereof in the secure en-
joyments of their rights, franchises and privileges; and will con-
stantly endeavor that the laws and ordinances of the commonwealth be
duly observed, and that the law and justice, in mercy, be executed in
all judgments; and lastly, I do solemnly promise and swear that I wil
1. Ilorth Carolina I've cords, xxiv. 485«
2. Henry, "Life, Correspondence and Speeches of Patrick Henry,"
i. 620.
£. Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, x. 256.

peaceably unci quietly resign tne government, to which I hove been
elected, at the several periods to which my continuance in the said
office is or shall De limited by law and the constitution. So help
1
me God."
It seems that aoout all that could De required of an ex-
ecutive with little power was emoodied in this oath. Lilassacnuse tts t
however, four years later, when the war was practically over as rar
as Hew England was concerned, placed in her constitution a more
elaborate and comprenensive oath as is seen in the following: "I,
A. i3., do declare, that I believe the Christian religion, and have
a firm persuasion 01 its truth, and that I am seized and possessed,
in my own right, of property required by the constitution as one
qualification for tne office or place to which I am elected.
"I, A.B., do truly and sincerely acknowledge and profess,
testify and declare tnat tne commonwealth of iiassachuse tts , is and
of right ought to be, a free, sovereign and independent state: and
I do swear, that I will Dear true faith and allegiance to tne said
commonwealth, and tnat I will defend tne same against traitorous con-
spiracies and all hostile attempts wnatsoever: And that I do renounce
and aDjure all allegiance, suDjugation, and oDedience to the King,
Ueen or government of Great Britain ( as the case may De ) and every
otner foreign power wnatsoever: ^nd that no foreign prince, person,
prelate, state or potentate, hath or ought to nave, any jurisdiction,
superiority, pre-eminence, authority, dispensing or otner power, in
any matter, civil, ecclesiastical, or spiritual, within this common-
wealth; except the authority and power which is or may be vested by
--o—
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tneir constituents in tne Congress or the United States: And I do
[further testify and declare, that no man or body or men hath or can
have any right to absolve or discharge me from the obligation or this
oath, declaration or arfirmation; and that I make tnis acknowledge-
ment, profession, testimony, declaration, denial, renunciation, and
abjuration, heartily and truly, according to the common meaning and
acceptance or ztie roregoing words, without any equivocation, mental
reservation or secret evasion whatsoever. So help me Sod."
"I, A.B. , do solemnly swear and affirm that I will faith-
fully and impartially discharge and perform all duties incumbent on
me as ( governor); according "co the best of my abilities and under-
standing, agreeably to the rules and regulations of the constitution
1. 2.
and the laws of tnis commonwealth. So help me Sod."
That tnis oath embodies the sense of a declaration of rights
and independence of the people is evident. It recognizes only one
other power above the governor - the Continental Congress.
In these two types, then, there are set forth evidences
or a weak and a strong executive whose powers will be explained
;ILater
.
1. Journals or Convention, ^4t>-^46.
2. Provisions were made for "chose ofricers wno might happen to
be Quakers, to refrain rrom the "oath" and insert "This I do under .
pains and penalties of perjury."

6 . Salaries
.
When Thomas Jefferson drafted his plan of a constitution
and submitted it to the Virginia convention, he allowed no remuner-
1
,ation for the governor, except for his official expenses. The con-
stitution, itself, however, was silent on the matter; and in this
respect the government of Virginia was not singular; for the con-
stitutions of out row of the states made mention of pay for the
governor's services, and those that did, left the point to De settled
by statutory provisions. The Virginia legislature, in October, 1776,
enacted as the first statute pertaining to this question, "That from
henceforth no fee shall be paid to the governor of this commonwealth
for any marriage or ordinary license to be issued pursuant to any
2
former act of assembly." For a short time fees were the only com-
pensation that the governor of Virginia received; but Patrick Henry,
who was the first to take the office, was before Ions: given a fixed
3
salsry of 10C0 pounds per year. As money was depreciating and
"times were hard," the governor's salary was raised by an act of
Hay, 1779, to 45C0 pounds per annum; and when, during the same
session, the capital was moved from Williamsburg to Richmond, the
4
governor was given a residence. In October of the same year the sum
5
twas again increased, to 7500 pounds. Yet, as the price of money
was still falling, and the country was becoming flooded with depre-
ciated currency, in May, 1780, the salary was fixed at 60000 pounds
6
of toba3CO per annum, payable quarterly. By this legislative step
1. Ford, "The Writings of Thomas Jefferson," ii. 28.
2. Hening, "Statutes at Large," ix. 225*
2. Henry, "Life ,CorrespondenceJand Speeches of Patrick Henry, "1.457
4. Hening, "Statutes at Large," x» 118«
5. Ibid. t x. 86.
6. .bid., x. 219.
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the executive was little better off, because of nis inability to
find a good, sale for tne uobacco. finally in November, 1731, the war
now practically over, the governor's allowance was placed at 1000
pounds specie annually, payable quarterly.
In fiorth Carolina tne governor was granted lbOO pounds per
annum "for his services in lieu of the fees and emoluments wnatso-
2 Z
lever;" and in Liay, 1779, this amount was raised to bCOO oounds,
4^
only *co be increased -cne following year to 13000 pounds. At this
time the war was waging hottest in the South, and the southern state
currency had become so depreciated in value that in December, two
5
hundred pounds of it would purchase only one pound of specie. Con-
6
isequently, the governor's salary was made 750 pounds specie for the
7
next year. In 1782 it was raised to a 1000 pounds specie, at which
rate it remained until 1795, when it dropped back to 700 pounds.
In Pennsylvania there was no statutory provision tor sal-
aries for any of the state officers until December, 1701, when the
8
president was given an annual sum of 1250 pounds. This amount was
9
increased to 1500 pounds in 1785.
In Massachusetts the constitution did not go into operation
^10
(without vigorous opposition to the governor's salary. The constitu-
tion declared "that as tne public good requires that the governor
{should not be under the undue influence of any of the members of the
--0--
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general court, by a dependence on them for support.... that he should,
in all cases, act with freedom for the benefit of the public... that
he should not nave nis attention necessarily diverted from that
object to nis private concerns... and that he should maintain the
dignity of the commonwealth in the character of its cnief magistrate
... it is necessary that ne snould nave an honorable stated salary,
of a fixed and permanent value, amply sufficient for tnose purposes
and established oy standing laws: and it shall be among the first
acts of tne general court, after the commencement of this constitu-
1
tion, to establish such salary by law accordingly."
We see, then, that because of the failure of the con-
stitutions to do more tnan suggest that the executives be remunerated
for their services, the chief magistrates had to rely entirely upon
the liberality of their respective legislative bodies for salaries:
and furthermore, that these salaries varied greatly from year to
year as the valuation of money fluctuated.
--0--
1. Constitution of ioassachuse tts , Part ii., Ghap.ii., Sect, i.,
Art. xiii.

CHAPTER IV.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF IHE EXECUTIVE.
1. saagg »
The constitutions of most of the states were silent as to
the method, of communication between the governor and the legislature;
out Georgia and Hew York clearly specified that communication should
be by message. In Georgia, "all transactions frorr. governor to legis-
1
lature and from legislature to governor" were to be by that means.
In New York it was the duty "of the governor to inform the legisla-
ture at every session, of the condition of the state, so far as
may respect his department;" and he was also to "recommend such
matters to their consideration as shall appear to him to concern its
2
good government,' welfare, and property*" .Even though the message was
inot required by most of tne constitutions; yet the executives
frequently resorted to its use. llorth Carolina, Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania magistrates very often made requests of their respective legis-
latures and imparted information to them by means of the message.
£ . P owers Granted .
The governor, with the advice and consent of the council,
was to execute the powers of the government according to the laws of
the commonwealth, and should not "under any pretence, exercise any
power or prerogative by virtue of any law, statute or custom, of
3
England." Thus did the Virginia constitution prescrioe the powers
and duties of the governor in terras signifying determined resistance
to English rule. Upon assuming an independent form of state governmen
--0--
1. Constitution of Georgia, Art. 52.
2. Constitution of I.row York, iirt. xix.
3. Hening, "Statutes at Large," ix. 115.

(Virginia turned to Patrick Henry and chose him as its first chief
magistrate .i«Ir. Henry felt that to execute the powers of the govern-
ment according to the laws of the commonwealth was a stupendous
jtask. "I lament ray want of Talents*" he wrote in his acceptance, "I
feel ray mind filled witn anxiety and uneasiness, to find myself
so unequal to the duties of that important office, to which I am
[called by the favor of my fellow citizens at this truly critical
1
on juncture." The United States had just declared their independence
the British troops rcre narassing Boston; the Continental Congress
was endeavoring to raise an army with which to confront the enemy;
and Virginia was called upon to lend her assistance in overcoming
tne foe. Here was a great task with but little law for guidance. The
nation was new, and tne statutes were made under English control.
There was urgent need for the repeal of old laws, and for the enact-
iment of new ones. The General Assembly realized the situation, and
In October, 1776, conveyed "Co the governor and council the cowers
2
that nad been vested in committees of safety prior to tne adoption
of the constitution.
In all the states, at this time, conditions were very much
as they were in Virginia: but few laws, and an approacning war. In
Korth Carolina all breaches of the statutes made in tne time of the
late governor Martin and directed to be prosecuted in his name,
and all bonds made by virtue of any act of the assembly payable to
o
him, were to be prosecuted in the name of the new commonwealth. All
ithe states had to revise their laws and enact special ones to meet
--0--
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the crisis. The entire Union saw the need of strong men in the ex-
ecutive chairs. The selection of such men as Henry of Virginia,
Kichard Caswell of Korth Carolina, John Autledge of South Carolina,
George Clinton of New York, Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut give
proof to Samuel Adams's philosophy that "The first governor may
probably nave it in his power to do more good or more harm than any
1
of nis successors" These men proved to "do more good," for they all
served the maximum number of terms fixed by the constitutions of
their respective states; and at the expiration of the periods of their
ineligibility, Hut ledge, Caswell and Henry were given their seats
again.
At the expiration of Governor Henry's third term and after
tne election of Thomas Jefferson as nis successor, the following
criticism by St. Seorge Tucker came out against the retiring officer:
"I wish his excellency's ( meaning iir. Jefferson's ) activity may be
equal to the abilities he possesses in so eminent a degree. In that
case we may ooast of having the greatest man on the continent in the
helm. But if he should tread in the steps of his predecessor, there
is not much to be expected from the brightest talents. Did the enemy
know now very defenceless we are at present, a very small addition
to their late forces would be sufficient to commit the greatest
ravages throughout tne country. It is a melancholy fact that there
were not arms enough to put in the hands of the few militia who were
called down on the late occasion; of those which were to be nad , a
great number were not fit for use. Hor was there by any means a
sufficiency of ammunition or camp utensils of any kind. In short,
-o-
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(never was a country in a more shabby situation; for our fortifications
and marine, on which more than a million have been thrown away, are
in no capacity to render any service to us; Eor have we any standing
force to give the smallest check to an approaching enemy. In two
days after the departure of the fleet, they might have returned and
found nobodv to opoose them. Such wisdom, energy and foresight do
I
our leaders display on every occasion."
Governor Henry was very conscious of the fact that he was
unable, as would oe any other governor who was hampered by an exec-
utive council, to meet the demands made upon him. At first he did
not nave even the power to carry into execution the acts of Congress,
and acquired it only when the threatening attitude of the enemy
2
forced from the Virginia General ^ssemoly a vigorous law granting
him and the council the power to follow the wishes of the Uational
legislative body. "Our circumstances being much distressed," wrote
Jefferson during the same session, "it was proposed, in the House of
a.
Delegates, to create,.Dictat or , invested with every power .legislative J
executive and judiciary, civil and military, of life and death, over
4
our persons and over properties." This dictatorial scheme , according
to 'Jirardin produced unusual heat and violence in the legislature:
those who favored, and those who opposed it, walked on different
sides of the streets. Patrick Henry, it seems, was to have been "Che
man for the place.
--0--
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The idea of a dictator came up again in the Virginia Assem-
bly in 1781, when George Nicholas proposed the appointment of Gen-
eral Washington in Virginia. This, too, met with heated opposition;
hut when "iir. Nicholas sat down, -ir. Henry" ( then serving in the
Assembly) "addressed the chair: he observed that it was immaterial
with him wnether the office proposed was called a Dictator, or gov-
ernor with enlarged powers, or by any other name, yet surely an
officer armed with such power was necessary to restrain the unbridled
1
fury of a licentious enemy, and concluded by seconding the motion."
How that the war was being transferred rrom the South to Virginia,
and there was nope that the struggle would soon be over, a strong
executive was needed. Governor Jefferson felt this need possibly
more than any other person; and believed that the public, under the
pressure of the invasion which Virginia was then suffering, would
have more confidence in a military chief, and that, if he who held
military command were also invested with civil power, "both might be
wielded with more energy, promptitude and effect for the defence of
2
tne state." Consequently he resigned in June, 1781; and for hie suc-
cessor the General Assembly chose Thomas kelson, who, after a ser-
vice of six months also resigned. During the seige of Yorktown Gov-
ernor Kelson had been compelled to perform many acts without consent
of the Council, for the purpose of procuring subsistence ror the
allied armies under Washington's command. Consequently, in November,
1781, a lav/ was passed declaring that all such acts of government,
evidently productive of general good and warranted by necessity,
--0--
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should oe as valid as it oy consent of the council; and that Govern-
or ITelson should be "indemnified and exonerated from all penalties
1
ana damages wnich might have accrued to him from the same." Ben-
jamin Harrison was elected to rill the vacancy created oy the resig-
BUtion of Governor Nelson, and served three terms. The war was now
over; out tne state needed a strong leader to tide over its affairs
until they should come into a more stable condition. Again tne Gen-
eral Assembly turned to Patrick Henry whom they selected to serve
tne state tv/o years longer.
When South Carolina drafted the temporary constitution of
1776, a veto clause was inserted which gave the Governor the right
to oppose any legislation that the law-making body might propose.
This right was brought into use in 1778 when Governor John Kutledge
vetoed tne new plan of government presented by the legislature, on
the grounds that it disestablished the church and provided for a
second legislative chamber, a senate instead of a legislative
2
council. As soon as Governor Hutledge negatived the new constitution,
he resigned; and Arthur Middletpn was elected. But he, likewise,
vetoed it, and then resigned, whereupon the Assembly elected Kawlins
Lowndes, who approved the proposed constitution. Lowndes was not a
leader of any unusual merit, and held the governorship only from
lAarch, 1778, to ITovemoer of tne same year, when the state was re-
3
organized under tne new form of government. South Carolina nad,at
that Lime, no man as strong in leadership as John Hutledge ; and al-
thougn ne nad exercised the right of veto against the adoption of
--0--
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the permanent constitution, ne was called back to the governor*
s
chair. licCrady quotes Ramsay as saying, "That before the General
Assembly which elected John Kutledge, adjourned, they had delegated
to nim and to nis council power to do everything that appeared to
1
him and to tnem necessary ror the public good." In fact he received
almost dictatorial power, and tor two years managed the war, with the
aid of that part of tne executive council which he "could convenient-
ly consult . "The power to do everytning for the welfare of the
commonwealth "except take away the life of a citizen without legal
2
trial" was his. The enemy realized nis strengtn and sougnt to seize
him. In 1730, in order to prevent Deing captured, ne tied from tne
enemy and made his way to Philadelphia, where ne exerted nis inrlu-
ence to procure aid tor his state.
Outside of iaassaohu.se tts , the northern states did not grant
their executives powers so great as those which South Carolina dele-
gated to its governor .Hew York had offered the governorship to John
^ay, but he refused it in favor of George Clinton. Clinton at once
exercised the constitutional right of his headship of the military
affairs and aided Washington and the army of the Uorth in every
possible manlier. In 1780 he even took the field, himself, against the
enemy and marched to Crown Point to cut off a body of 3ritish who had
threatened to make another attack on the Mohawk Valley. The political
and moral conditions in Kew York, also, were such that a broad-minded
executive was necessary to cope with the situation. Gouverneur lvlorris,
Writing to Jay in April, 1778, said," Let your governor cleanse the
--o—
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Augean Stable in his state, which no public body would do though it
1
stink under tneir noses."
3y an act of the Pennsylvania legislature ularoh 11, 1777,
the president was given the same power and authority to order and
direct tne execution of the government as any previous governor had
2
had. But the president was, after all, very much hindered in his
actions because of the fact that a very large majority of the legis-
lative enactments nad been so framed as to give the administrative
power to the Supreme Executive Council of which the president was
chairman.
The authority used by the governors in Ehode Island and
Connecticut depended very much upon the man in the office. In the
former state, the executive and the council did little without the
consent of the legislature except between sessions. Connecticut,
however, had in Jonathan Trumbull a man of ability, who was ever
active in aiding the cause of freedom. The follov/ing letter to
Horatio Sates probably shows the spirit of the man as well as any of
his executive acts:
"Jonathan Trumbull to Horatio Grates,
Lebanon, 29th Septera1", 1777.
th
Sir,- Yours of the IV by 3rown was received the next Tuesday, to-
gether with the accounts of the action of Friday. Permit me to con-
gratulate you on that affair; such a beginning augurs well of what is
to follow. We have accounts since by Bennington that Col Brown has
succeeded in his enterprise against Ty--. I hope this will prove true.
-
-o--
1. "Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay,"i. 177.
2. "Pennsylvania Statutes at Large," ix. 64.

This moment, we nave accounts from the westward of General Howe':,
having outgeneral 'd us, as I find from General Putnam, that he has
already sent you the news. 'Tis strange that such an army must
continually retire without once daring; to fight an enemy who at the
same time they effect to consider as their inferior.
"Troops are collecting in this, Massachsetts , and Rhode
Island States for the attack of the enemy at Ilewport. The numbers
are for tne Massachusetts 2,600
Rhode Island 2,500
Connecticut 1,500
in two regiments under command of Colonels Ely & McClellan, two very
good officers. The first regiment has "been in the service these three
months, the other is raised for the occasion. Every method is taken
to prevent any correct intelligence from getting to the island. The
descent will probably be made the second week of October.
"I have sent Brown to the western arm:/ and Congress. In
his place I wish you to send a Jabez Fitch, one of your militia
horse. His captain I have forgot, but ^aj' r Hyde or Lieut. Abraham
Fitch will point him out to you. He is trusty, and there are particu-
lar inducements for me to ask his discharge. By then Brown will have
returned
.
n$t$ son your paymaster will deliver you this & can give yoi}
all the stories which fill the country , I am, Sir,
Most respectfully, your very obedient, hbl e . servant
Die r 1Eon Maj General Gates."
--0--
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Trumbull's Loyalty towards the confederation i3 also 3een
in his words to the Connecticut delegates in the Continental Congress;,
in which he expresses deep anxiety to see the confederation completed.
"The four states - how long must the others wait for them? If they
are not like to comply soon should we not confederate without them?"
In another case he manifested true patriotism by ignoring Tryon's
2
cole orated peace proposition and by informing him that Congress was
the body with whom all peace negotiations should oe made.
In most cases it has been shown that the executives had
about as little individual constitutional power as the framers of
the instruments could devise. Had not the legislatures provided
additional authority South Carolina and Virginia could not have shown
as much activity as they did in helping to bring the war of the
Revolution to a close.
Z* The Lack of hxecutive Power .
Curtailment of executive power by the revolutionary con-
stitutions rather than the granting of it seems to have been their
aim. In Eew Hampshire the executive power was vested in a governor
whom the convention, in their address to the people, described in the
following terms: "They have arrayed him v/ith honors, they have armed
him with power and set him on high; but still he is only the right
5
hand of your power, and the mirror of your majesty." Though armed
with power and liable to he impeached for misconduct, he was shrouded
from responsibility oy a council without whose advice he could not
take a step of importance. The council to the magistrates who were
--o
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responsible for what they did were generally better than a "olog
upon his good intentions often the instruments and accomplices
1
of his had; and almost always a cloak to his faults." In Noith
Carolina the powers of the council so hampered Governor Caswell that,
in his letter to Hon. John Penn and Col. Harnett, February 7, 1778,
he complained that "by the constitution of this state, nothing oan be
done by the Executive power of itself." He found it impossible to call
the assembly "though earnestly pressed thereto." I think if there is
any blame no be fixed on those who framed the constitution, a very
considerable part he ( Mr* Harnett) ought to take to himself for
2 S
cramping so much the power of the executive."
During Jefferson's administration Lucy Nelson wrote to the
governor to secure his aid in having Colonel Nelson appointed to a
command of which the Assembly had the disposal. Whereupon Jefferson
replied that no man who acts above board has any influence in any
4
appointments here "beyond the weight of his own vote*," thus showing
what little power he had over the legislative body. Governor Trum-
bull complained of the same conditions in his state. The assembly
would frequently adjourn for a short time without leaving the execu-
tive the power to call out the military force when there was a press-
ing need for them. In iihode Island executive communications by the
governor on matters of importance with other states and with Congress
had to be written by a committee appointed by the assembly, and after
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(wards submitted to them Tor approval oefore the governor was allowed
1
I
to sign them. Thomas Gushing, chairman of the General Court of
Massachusetts wrote, in 1776, to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island to
keep troops in readiness to assist Massachusetts in case the British
returned to retake Boston. To this urgent demand the governor replied
"At the request of the General Assembly, I am to acknowledge the re-
ceipt of yours...; and to inform you that.... this colony will afford
2
all the assistance in our power to give." On another occasion the
3
governor was ordered to write to Hew Hampshire; and later he issued
4
warrants and summonses for arrests by order of the Assembly. A
large number of calls for various settlements, actions, needs etc.,
addressed to the governors of the different states, were referred at
once to the Assemblies for action. On one occasion although salt was
in great demand in Virginia, Governor Henry could not supply it un-
til the Assembly had taken action on the matter.
Practically all the states made statutory provision for a
5
board of war during the most threatening and strenuous periods of
the conflict. Probably none of these boards, however, interfered
quite so much with the executive powers as did that of Rorth Carolina,
where the governor was made the mere executor of the board's deci-
sions. Governor Hash resented this, claiming his constitutional rights;
but as nis protest did nira no good, he resigned. The board was soon
found to be inefficient and was abolished January, 1781, after an
6
existence of four months. When Cornwallis decided to make nis second
-
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invasion through Uorth Carolina from the South, a Gounoil Extraordi-
nary wns, by an extra-constitutional stroke, created to exercise all ;
power of Council of State and Board of War. The Grovernor was nelpless.
He had to submit to the usurpation of nis power by this new Council
Extraordinary . He was hampered at practically every turn. The legis-
lative body had very little regard for nira. They considered him a
mere puppet whose power was to be curtailed or increased as suited
1
their legislative fancy.
4. The Council .
The old English and colonial idea of an executive council
as an advisory hoard to the governors manifested itself strongly in
the drafting of the revolutionary constitutions. Each state had its
council known as a Privy or Executive Council, of which the governor
was presiding officer and nad a vote in cases of ties. In South Caro-;
lina this body was chosen for two years in the same manner as was the
2
governor, to serve primarily as advisors in nis executive affairs.
The governor, nowever, was not bound to consult them unless so
directed by law. In Horth Carolina the advisory council, elected for
one year, could serve only three terms in succession, and not again
till after a lapse of three years. Their oath was fully as binding
3 4 5
as that which tne governor took. Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, Hew
G V GJersey, Hew York ana New Hampshire had practically tne same
-
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provisions as were found in the liorth Carolina constitution. In each
case the power of tne council was almost, if not quite, equal to that
of the governor. He had no check on them. The only body that did
exercise any control over tnera was the legislative assemblies.
Delaware varied slightly from the others in the filling of vacancies
to the Privy Council: while in tne other states, vacancies that
occurred before the expiration of the term of office were filled oy
appointments, In Delaware tne metnod was election."*"
Frequently the council took action without the governor's
sanction ana sometimes witnout his knowledge, as in a case in
Jefferson's administration. In the fall of 1779, he was obliged to be
away from tne capital for a short time; and upon returning he found
2
that the council nad removed the irons from the prisoners of war.
Governor Jefferson was as powerless in this affair as Governor Trum-
bull proved to oe in Connecticut. In April, 17SC, the council of
safety in tne latter state received an address from the governor to
the effect tnat tie nad received a letter rrora Rhode Island and
Massachusetts begging permission to get food and other provisions
from Connecticut. As the emoargo law then v/as , he could not regularly
permit this without advice from tne council. It seemed to him that thfc
requests were ooth reasonable and that the permission should be
granted. The council, nowever, rerused tne permit.
Pennsylvania with one legislative house probably granted
more power to tne Supreme Executive Council than did any other state.
(Dhere the council were elected for three years while tne president
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served but one. In case of invasions it was tne Supreme Kxecutive
Council who called out tne militia or ordered the battalions to meet
the enemy."*" It was tney who were empowered to oall out tne militia
to suppress anv attempt to set up a new government within Pennsylvania,
as was done in 1782. ^ When the British seized Philadelphia, it was
tne council who were given "full power to promote and provide for
the preservation of the commonwealth Dy sucn regulations and ordi-
nances as to them seemed necessary, and to proceed against, seize,
detain, impress, punish, either capitally or otherwise as the case
may require" all who are deemed inimical to the common cause of lib-
rz
erty and the United States of Uorth America." 7,'hen provisions were
needed for the army or the citizens and could not oe purchased, it
was tne council who gave tne orders to seize and appraise supplies.
[Any person feeling that he had Deen adjudged unjustly by the justices
of the peace nad the privilege of appealing to tne council, who
5
could pass upon the case.~ Case after case could be cited where the
Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania were given control of
matters over which one would expect the president to exercise author-
ity. The greatest contrast to Pennsylvania in this respect was
itossachusetts . In tnafc state the governor had a council for advisory
purposes; but they were his subordinates, not he theirs. If he saw
fit to call a council he might do so, or he might exercise his
6
executive power of his own free will.
--0--
1. "Pennsylvania Statutes at Large," ix. 583.
2. Ibid. , xi. 16.
3. Ibid., ix. 20.
4. Ibid., ix. 150.
5. Ibid., ix. 20.
6. "Constitution of .Massachusetts ," Part ii«. Chap, ii., Sect. 3.

b. Provisions for Filling Vacancies in the governorship *
In seven or the states constitutional provisions were made
for the election 01' a vice-president or a lieutenant-governor, Del-
aware, Maryland, Virginia ana South Carolina failing in this respect.
In nine, then, of the thirteen states- for, Rhode Island and Con-
necticut had deputy-governors - vacancies caused otherwise than Dy
the expiration of the executives' terras were filled by the vice-pres-
idents, deputy-governors or lieutenant-governors. In the other four
states the soeaker of the uoper house became the executive when the
case demanded..
b. Power of Appointments and Removals
.
The powers granted to the executives of making appointments
and removals may oe divided into constitutional and statutory. The
constitutional powers differed to a considerable extent in the vari-
ous states. Georgia allowed the governor, with tne advice and con-
sent of the council, to fill all interim vacancies that should hap-
pen in offices before the next general election; and all commissions,
civil and military were to be issued by the governor, under his hand
1
and tne great seal of tne state. South Carolina and Korth Carolina
bestowed very little appointive power on their executives, out gave
tnem rather more commissioning authority tnan did Georgia. In Mary-
land, the governor might for tne time being, with the advice and con-
sent of tne council, appoint the chancellor and all judges and
justices of the peace, attorney-general, naval officers in the regu-
lar land and sea service, officers of the militia, registers of the
-0-
1* Constitution of Georgia, Art. 21. I

54
land office, surveyors, and all other civil officersjof the govern-
ment; and he might, also, suspend or remove any civil officer who
had not a commission during good behavior. Furthermore, the governor
could remove any militia officer, in pursuance of the Judgment of a
1
court martial. The president and assembly of Delaware chose by
ballot three Justices of the supreme court, who received their com-
missions from the president .The assembly, nowever, nominated the
justices of the peace, but gave the pov.er of appointing them to the
president and council, who jointly appointed all other appointive
officers. In Pennsylvania, "The president, and in nis absence, the
vice-president, with the council, five of whom shall be a quorum,
shall have power to appoint and coramissionate judges, naval officers,
judges of the admiralty, attorney-general, and all other officers,
civil and military, except such as are chosen by the Greneral Assembly
or the people, agreeable to this frame of government and the laws
that may be made hereafter; and shall supply every vacancy, in any
office, occasioned by death, resignation, removal or disqualification,
until the office can be filled in the time and manner directed by
2
lav/ of this constitution." The right of the governor of Kew Jersey
to make appointments was curtailed as far as human ingenuity could
do so. In New York the governor, with the advice and consent of the
council, might appoint all officers whose appointment war not other-
wise provided for in the constitution; but a very large percentage
of them were provided for. Massachusetts was very liberal in bestow-
iing the privilege of appointments upon the governor, for all judicial
--o
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officers, attorney-general, solicitor-general, sheriff, ooronera
and registers of probates, were subject to the chief magistrate
1
council's appointment.
By statutory provisions the president and council of Penn-
sylvania were given the power to appoint, when vacancies occurred,
recorders, justices of the peace, freeholders as lieutenants, wagon-
masters, drawing clerks, copying clerks and clerks of foreign corre-
2
spondence* In Virginia the governor was given the privilege in
October, 1776, o L' reviewing the tobacco warehouses by means or two
S
inspectors appointed Dy nimself and council* In 1778 he was given
the right to appoint justices in the place of those wno failed to
4
serve when elected. A difficulty arising during the war, gave the
governor new powers of appointment, Many of the suspects who had
been imprisoned because of their friendly attitude towards tne enemy
would, under ordinary conditions, have to remain there until April,
1732. Consequently, in May, 1781, a special court was organized to
try all the ordinary cases that previously had gone to the general
court; and the governor was given the power, with the advise and con
5
sent of the council, to appoint three new judges for this new court.
Other instances could oc given or enactments which conferred upon the
executives in these and other states the power to appoint various
officers and commissions. As practically every state had to contend
with the Indians during tne war, commissions were necessitated to
treat with them; and these the governor of the state appointed.
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In the main, However, the appointive powers granted to the chief
magistrates by legislation were rather insignificant.
7. Actions against loyalists and Monopolizers .
Two of the worst evils that the American array and the loy-
al supporters at home had to contend with, were the class of citizens
who secretly assisted the lories in their support of the British
array, and the monopolizers who would rother sell their oirth-right
for a mess f pottage whan open their granaries ana warehouses to
feed and clothe those in distress, strenuous action was taken in all
the states against Doth classes. Te3t acts were passed which the cit-
izens were asked to sign in order to show their allegiance to the
cause of freedom. In Ehode Island, curing the first part of July,
1776, eighty persons suspected of being unfriendly to the colony had
been examined ana asked to sign the "test act". Out of this number
all but three refused, whereupon they were arrested and the matter
1
was referred to the governor for immediate action. As a result,
these men were held in order to keep them from rendering aid to the
British fleet that was expectea to return from Halifax almost any
kay. In Llay 1777, it was again necessary, in Lhode Island, to compel
some persons to subscribe, before the governor and supreme court, to
2
the test act of allegiance to the government of the United States.
Pennsylvania had been troubled with persons who aeniea their
fiaelity to the state. Consequently, the president and the supreme
executive council were given power to arrest all disaffected persons,
and to seize their papers. An opportunity was given to all who were
1. "Rhode Island Hecords," vii. 595.
2. Ibid., viii. 247.
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arrested to take the oath of allegiance before the president and
council; out in esse thev revised, they were imprisoned and denied
1
the privilege of habeas corpus, in order to protect the executive
from any suit that might be brought against him by any of these
suspects upon gaining their freedom, the legislature passed an act
indemnifying the president and all persons acting under his command
2
in connection with these cases.
The unscrupulous means to which some of those who remained
at home during the war, stooped in order to increase their wealth,
would make the raoaern trust Dlush with shame. A letter dated Williams-
burg, iJarch 28, 1777, from Governor Eenry to Richard Henry Lee at
Congress, gives one s very good idea of the condition of affairs.
"The practice, "he says, "of engrossing all foreign goods & country
produce has gotten to an enormity here, particularly in the latter
articles. Corn flour and meat are brought up (as 1 was informed by
Col. Aylett) in so much that it is almost impossible to furnish the
public demands, in such time as the necessitys of the army require...
... I hope the practice will he effectually stopped, or fatal conse-
quences must ensue." On the eighth of the following tJuly he issued
a proclamation against it.
In October of tne next year the general assembly had to
take action against the pernicious practice. In this act the governor,
With the advice and consent of the council, was given power to com-
mission men to seize all the ?-rain and flour necessary for the armies
jand navies of America and the French allies. These supplies were to be
1. "Rhode Island Records," ix. 139.
2. Ibid., ix. 140.
3. Henry, "Li fe .Correspondence and Speeches of Patrick Kenry,"
i. 51b.
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paid for according to the appraised value by three freeholders in the
county in which the stock was stored. If any resistance was made,
those in authority had the power to break open the warehouses and
1
take what was necessary. The act was renewed in Uay and in October
of 1779; and in I«Iay, 1730, the governor's power extended to include
the obtaining of "live cattle and linen for tents, wagon3 , boats or
2
other vessels and crews," In October, 1780, when the war was most
threatening in Virginia, the assembly renewed the act which ran until
May, 1781, when all acts were repealed on account of the inequality
of prices fixed by the appraisers. In December of the same year, an
act was passed giving the governor and council power to fix the
prices on appraised goods seized; and the following was the result:
Wheat, $66.66 per bushel; Indian corn, $20.00 per bushel; oats, $15. OC
per bushel; bacon, $20,00 per pound; salt pork, $12.00 per pound;
brandy, $60.00 per gallon; whiskey, $40.00 per gallon; West India
rum, $80.00 ner gallon; white biscuits, $£00.00 per hundred weight
;
3
fine flour, $200.00 per hundred v/eight. The situation in the north-
ern ststes was practically the same as it was in the middle and
southern. Massachusetts had to pass an act in the spring of 1777
fixing tne price on farm labor, and on such commodities as sus-ar,
4
salt, molasses, shoes, beef, iron, hay, etc. But on account of the
fluctuation of the market value of the products, this law was repeal
-
5
ed in the following fall. In Rhode Island goods were seized and
prices fixed; and the governor was given power to suppress monopolies.
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Pennsylvania was compelled to take action against the 3ame offences.
In January, 1778, a law was passed prohibiting persons from buying
1
of the forestallers. As the summer of 1778 had been a good season
for the crops, many of those who remained at home hoarded the fruit
! of their labor, and refused to sell it to the army and others who
were in need of it unless enormous prices were paid. Legislation had
to be made in behalf of the sufferers, authorizing the seizure of the
products needed and the payment of an appraised price for them. Sell-
ing goods at auction was stopped to prevent avaricious persons from
monopolizing the articles for sale; and any auctioneer desiring to
sell real estate must first give bona to the president and Supreme
2
Executive Council. It is a blot on the record of the American nation
that the soldiers fighting for liberty had, many times, to endure the
hardships of cold and hunger because lukewarm patriots were noarding
necessities
.
8. Ihe Power of the Executive to Lay Lmbar^oes
3 4
The governors in South Carolina, Uorth Carolina and the
5 6
presidents of Delaware ana Pennsylvania, were empowered, with the
advice ana consent of the councils, to lay embargoes and prohibit theji
exporting of any commodities auring the recess of the legislative
boaies, for a perioa not zo exceed thirty days;ana in Maryland the
aavice of the council was unnecessary. Nearly all the states made
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(statutory provisions authorizing the executives, with the consent of
j
the council, to lay embargoes in order to prevent the enemy from
^collecting rood and clothing. An instance of the stringency with
which these laws were enforced is to be noted in Connecticut. A
gentleman from New York had bought eighty hogsheads of molasses from
Rhode Island and was transporting them across Connecticut when that
state passed the embargo act.jiuch of the molasses was seized, and
oefore the remainder oould oe shipped further, a permit from the
1
Connecticut Assembly had to be obtained. In another case, the people
of Rhode Island were in great need of supplies, but were unable to get
them from New York because of the embargo law in the latter state.
Many Rhode Islanders who had been in comfortable circumstances were
2
compelled to beg for food and wearing apparel, nevertheless, these
drastic laws had to De adopted, to prevent the disloyal portion of the
population from putting into the nands of the enemy the greater part
!bf the noarded-up supplies.
9 • ? ne Granting of Pardons and Reprieves .
The state constitutions were quite explicit in the granting
Of power to pardon and reprieve criminals. The only limitation in
Uassachuse tts was in the case of convictions oefore the Senate by an
«-/ • I
impeachment of the House. In Pennsylvania, the governor and council
were given "power to grant pardons, and remit fines, in all cases
whatsoever, except in cases of impeachment." In cases of murder. and
treason they were privileged t;o grant reprieves until the next meeting
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of tne Assembly. In the rest of tne states the constitutional rights
pertaining to pardons and reprieves were rauoh the same as in LJassa-
cnusetts, impeaenments oeing tne principal cases upon which the
2
executives were not allowed to act. niany legislative acts were pass-
ed giving the governors power to grant pardons in special cases. For
instance, in ITorth Carolina, on November 22, 1776, the governor was
given tne right to issue a proclamation to the erfect that all who
would take tne oath of allegiance would be pardoned for all offences
against the state. Pennsylvania, likewise, granted extra power by
allowing the president to suspend or revoke any punishment to which
|a militia-man might be sentenced by a general court martial, except
4
in cases of high treason. Shortly after this act, the legislature
enacted a law whereby tne president and council could pardon persons
sentenced to death for treason or felony on condition tnatc tney
leave the state,with tne proviso that such pardon should be rescinded
5
if the criminals returned. The executive proclamation was used in
several cases, especially by Governors Jefferson and luitledge. Gov-
ernor Rutledge's proclamation of September 27, 1781, was issued in
response to many appeals wnich nad oeen made for tne pardon or tne
Tories. Finally he issued an official notice granting pardon to tnose
who desired to return, with certain exceptions, a summary or which
is as follows: "1. .all persons who, having gone over to or joined
ifche enemy, have bailed to avail themselves of the provisions of the
two proclamations of nis Excellency, the governor, to surrender
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themselves to a magistrate within forty day3 after the respective
dates of those proclamations
.
"2. All persons returning after having been sent off or obliged to
quit the state for refusing to take the oath required of them by law.
"3. All those who subscribed a congratulatory address to General,
Sir Henry Clinton, to Vice-Admiral iirbuthnot, and to ^ieutenant-
Greneral Earl Gornwallis.
"4. All such as at the time held any commissions, civil or military,
under the British government, and were then with the enemy.
"5. All those whose conduct had been so infamous as that they could
not (consistently with Justice and policy) be admitted to partake
1
of the privileges of America." These exceptions must, certainly, have
affected a very large class of people; for the British sympathizers
were a large par; of the southern population during the days of the
Revolution.
10. The Light of Lxeoutive Veto .
Probably there was no one power that the people were more
anxious to keep out of the hands of the chief magistrates than that
of the veto, idany of the leading statesmen, however, saw the need of
it; but they were not sufficiently convincing in their arguments to
have it incorporated in all the constitutions. In Virginia a strong
;plea was made by Patrick Henry for an executive check on legislation.
Edmund Randolph says, "After creating the office of governor, the
Convention gave way to tneir horror of a powerful chief magistrate,
witnout waiting ;o reflect how much stronger a governor mignt be
imade for the benefit of tne people, and yet be held with a republican
1
l.MoCrady, "History of South Carolina, 1780-83," 523.

63
bridle. These were not times of terror, indeed; Out every hint of
power, which night be stigmatised as being of royal origin, obscured
for a time a part of their patriotic splendor which the movers had
before shown. Uo member but Henry could, with impunity to his popu-
larity, have contended as strenuously as he did for an executive
veto on the acts of the two houses of legislation. Those who knew
jhira to be indolent in literary investigations, were astonished at the
manner in which he exhausted the topic, unaided as he was believed to
be by any of the treatises on government, except uontesquieu. Among
other arguments he averred that a governor would be a mere phantom,
unable to defend his office from the usurpation of the legislature,
unless he could interpose on a vehement impulse or ferment in that
body, and that he would otherwise be ultimately a dependent, instead
1
of a co-ordinate, branch of power*" Had the governor been given the
right of veto, the bill requiring that, after a delegate to congress
has served three successive terms, a lapse of one year should inter-
vene before he could again be returned to that seat, would never have
passed; for the law was aimed at Richard Henry Lee by Thomas «3effer-
[son, its introducer.
The first Constitution of South Carolina did give to the
governor the right of veto - a power which at the time of the pro-
posing of the second constitution proved menacing. Governor Rutledge
vetoed the new form of government on the grounds that it tended to
prevent an amicable settlement of the dispute between England and
America, that it disestablished the church, and that it created a
2
senate. In the second constitution this weapon was taken from the
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governor; and. nc was merely to revise Dill3, not to veto them.
Uassaciiusetts t in framing ncr plan of government, first in-
serted a no veto clause. That constitution, nowevor, was re jected'.and
subsequently in the constitution of 170U, the governor was given the
right of negative if exercised within five days after receiving the
I
Dill. The war was now nearly over; and Massachusetts besides having,
\
I in "Che affairs of the otner stages, abundant illustrations of nasty
I
I legislation ana of throttled executive power, felt the cogency of tne
[arguments wnich ner leaders were urging in behalf of the veto clause.
John Adams in writing zo Llbridge Oerry in November, 1779, said,
jl"The executive, wnich ought to be tne reservoir of wisdom, as the
^legislature is of liberty, without nis weapon of defence will be run
1
[down like a hare before the nunters." She provision that the veto
[was valid only if the bill was returned within rive aays, was put to
a test two years after its adoption, when the question arose, wheth-
er Sunday should be considered as one of the five days. The con-
troversy is best described by Samuel Adam3 in the following letters;
"To John Lowell,
"Boston, May 15th, 1782.
("ily dear Sir,--
"The general court was prorogued Friday, the tenth instant,
previous to which on the same day the governor sent "cne Impost Bill
to tne nouse of Representatives with his objections and reasons
against it stated in form. The house conceiving that the five days to
which ne was limited oy the constitution, had expired the preceding
day, sent it back to nim without reading the objections, as Deing in
--0--
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their opinion to all intont and purposes a law. It seems that the
bill had been aen; to the governor on Saturday* He excludes Sunday
from the five days, in which the House differs in opinion It
is a subject of speculation among the political casuists If the
bill has become a law how will it operate? What will be the opinion
of Congress concerning it under it3 present circumstances?" A later
letter to Mr. Lowell by the same hand shows how the difficulty was
circumvented: "The House of Representatives inquired whether the
Impost Bill had been forwarded to Congress or not. It was found that
the governor still opposed it and sent a message to that effect. The
two houses resolved that the governor held it over time without re-
turning it with nis veto, and it was therefore a law.
"It will probably be repealed and a new bill brought up
1
in order to avoid a quarrel."
The check on the Hew York legislature was vested in the
Governor, the chance lloijand the judges of the supreme court, who
were to act as a council to revise all bills about to be enacted by
the legislature. If this council did not approve of the bill pro-
posed, they returned it to the nouse from which it originated with
their objections. If the legislature chose they still might act upon
it; and if two-thirds majority in both houses were secured, it
became a law. In case she bill was not returned within ten days afte
the council received it, and the legislature aid not adjourn within
that time, it became a law.
--o—
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Thus of cloven permanent constitutions, only one granted
veto power to tne oilier executive, and one gave that right to a board
of which tne governor waa a memoer. Of the temporary constitutions,
one gave the governor the negative to legislative bills, wnile the
permanent form of government by which it waa succeeded deprived nira of
that right, and allowed him merely to revise the measures proposed
by the legislature.
11. Powers Relative _to the Adjourning and Galling of Legi s-
ture
.
Practically all the constitutions were alike in not allowing
the executive to dissolve, adjourn or prorogue the legislative bodies
though giving him the power to assemole the latter during their
1
receases when necessity demanded such action, xoassachusetts ana Hew
2
Hampshire were slight exceptions, in that their executives could
prorogue the General Courts for a period not to exceed ninety days
r
in case the two nouses could not agree upon a time for adjournment.
Throughout the United states several cases are recorded of the legis-
lative bodies naving been assembled at the call of the executives.
These instances were usually at the time of some imminent danger from
the enemy. Uhen the British were making their v/ay into Virginia,
•x
Jefferson twice called for special sessions: one foi iJarch, 1781,
4
and the other for i.lay of tne same year. Hhode Island, likewise, held
a few extra sessions at the call of the governor. Just how difficult
it was to get enough members of tne legislature to transact business,
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to a3seraole at suoh sessions is shown t$ the following oall issued
by Governor Cooke:
"Providence, Deo* 11, 1776.
"Gentlemen:- The absolute necessity of the General Assemoly'a meeting
time is so verj obvious, that it is needless for me to mention par-
ticulars. The forces that are already arrived in this 3tate, make it
necessary that suitable provisions be made for them. Committees must
be appointed to meet delegates from the neighboring states, in order
that the proper magazines be established for the support of the army;
indeed the very many and important things to be transacted at this
critical time, will not admit of excuse from any member of either
house. I must therefore entreat that his Honor the Deputy Governor,
Mr. Potter, Mr. Sayles, Mr. Church, together with every member of
each house of assemDly in Bristol Co., do immediately come to Provi-
dence; which if they do, we shall be able to constitute a house; The
most of the memoers who met this day at Greenwich, have concluded to
come here, and some of them have arrived.
"Gentlemen, pray do not neglect coming, as tne occasion is
so very pressing; you may easily conceive the disadvantages that will
occur at this time if there are not sufficient memoers to make a
1
house .
"
Hot only is it evident that legislators were sometimes loath
to assemole , out from the chief magistrate's entreating words it is
clear that, with bridled power he had no effective means of insuring
their attendance.
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12. Judicial cowers »
During the provincial day3 there was opportunity to appeal
to the King or some of nis high courts; ior many times Justice had
been either denied or obstructed in the lower courts. How, that the
Americans were no longer under the English law, it was necessary to
have a court of errors and appeals. L>uch a court was provided Oy an
act of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, February 28, 1780.
It was to consist of the president of the supreme executive council,
Judges of the supreme court, the judge of Admiralty and three others.
They were to hear appeals from the supreme court and court of Admi-
1
ralty, in all cases of errors.
Only one other state, made constitutional provision for the
exercise of judicial power Dy the executive; that was Delaware.
According to its frame of government 'There shall be an appeal from
the supreme court of Delaware in matters of lav/ and equity, to a
court of seven persons, to consist of the president, for the time be-
ing, wno shall preside therein, and six others. ... commissioned by the
2
president under the great seal."
By the Pennsylvania constitution "The president, and in his
absence, the vice-president, with the council, five of whom shall be
a quorum, are to sit as judges, and determine on impeachments,
3
taxing to tneir assistance only the supreme court." By the rejected
constitution of Massachusetts the governor and senate were to consti-
tute a court for the trial of all impeachments except in tne case of
the governor, lieutenant-governor and senators, when the House was to
--o
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sit aa a court. This provision, however, was not included in the new
plan of government.
Such were the judicial powers granted to the executives.
Yet in no case were they free from the power o iT the legiblaturcs ; for
all were sub-'ect to impeachment.
11 . The Power off the hxc outivc in Military iiffairs .
All the state constitutions granted some military powers tc
their executives. These are probably best illustrated in South Caro-
lina on the one hand and idassachuset ts on the other. In the former
state the executive was ^iven the title of "Governor and Commander-
in- chief," with "no power to commence war or to conduct peace or en-
ter into any final treaty without the consent of the senate and
1
house of representatives." In the latter state, "The governor of
this commonwealth, for the time being, shall be the commander-in-
chief of the army and navy, and of all the military forces of the
state, by sea and land; and shall have full power, by himself, or
by any commander, or other officer or officers, from time to time,
to train, instruct, exercise and govern the militia and navy; and
for tne special safety and defence of the commonwealth to assemble in
martial array, and put in warlike posture, the inhabitants thereof,
and to lead and conduct them, to encounter, repel, resist, expo 11, and
pursue, by force of arms, as v/ell by sea as by land, within or witnou
the limits of this commonwealth, and also to kill, slay, and destroy,
if necessary, and conquer by all fitting ways, enterprises and means
whatsoever, ail and every such person and persons as shall, at any
--0--
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time hereafter in a Hostile manner, attempt or enterprise trie destruo^
tion, invasion, detriment, or annoyance of this commonv/oaith ; and to
use and to exercise, over the army and navy, and over tne miiitia in
actual service, tiie lav: martial in time of war or invasion, and also
in time of reoellion, declared by the legislature to exist, as occa-
sion shall necessary require, and to take and to surprise oy all ways
and means whatsoever, ail and every person and persons, with their
ships, arms, ammunition and other goods, as shall, in a hostile
manner, invade
,
or attempt the invasion, conquering, or annoying
this commonwealth; and that the governor be intrusted with all these
nd other powers, incident to the office of captain-general and com-
fnander- in-chief , and admiral, to be exercised agreeably to the rules
and regulations of the constitution, and the laws of the land, and
not otherwise."
"Provided, that the said governor shall not at any time
lereafter, by virtue of any power by this constitution granted, or*
lereafter to be granted to him by the legislature, transport any of
the inhabitants of this commonwealth, or oblige them to march out of
1
the limits of tne same without their free and volutary consent."
The Massachusetts constitution further provided that cap-
Sains end subalterns of the militia should be elected by their re-
spective companies, ana that these officers, in turn, should elect the
field officers of their regiments. Tne urigadiers were also elected
ay the captains and subalterns; but the senate and house of represent-
atives exercised the right of appointing the major-generals.
All commissioned officers received their commissions from
--0--
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the governor and could not be removed from office excopt by address
of both houses of the general court to the governor or by trial in
court-rr.arshall
.
In addition to the above military powers that the governor
possessed the Massachusetts constitution also gave him, with the ad-
vice of the council, the right to appoint all officers of the con-
tinental array , "whom by the confederation of the United States" it
was provided that that commonwealth should appoint, and "also all
1
officers of forts and garrisons."
In Hew Hampshire the executive authority over the military
2
forces was practically the same as it was in Massachusetts.
In each of the other states, except Rhode Island and Con-
necticut, constitutional provision was made for the executive to
serve as commander-in-chief of the military forces in his state re-
3 4 5
spectively; and in 3-eorgia, Hew York and Maryland he had super-
vision over the navy. Each of the eleven constitutions granted the
commissioning of officers to its executive; but gave to the companies
the right of electing their own captains and other minor orficers.
Although each of the state constitutions stipulated that
the executive should have charge of the military forces; yet statu-
tory provisions nad to be made in order to give the commander-in-
chiefs more specific powers in times of emergencies. The boards of
war, that the states resorted to, aid not meet the needs and were
soon abolished in many of the states. This necessitated the increase
— o--
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t>. Constitution of Maryland, Art. xxxiii.

of tiic executives' military powers. These powers were great cr small,
in the different states, according to tho willingness of the legis-
latures to grant thera.
In Hhodo Island, it 3eems that the governor was not vested
with much military authority. The charter of 1662, granted to him
and the majority of nis assistants the right "att any tyme when the
sayd General assembly" was "not sitting, to nominate, apoynt and
constitute, such and so many commanders, and military officers,
1
as to them shall soem requisite." These powers were increased hut
Little. Although the governor was authorized to consult with General
2
1
Washington regarding reenlistment of troops and their pay and clothing
and to call on him for forces in times of danger, and to consult with
him regarding the exchange of provisions; yet he was curtailed in
military affairs first hy the council of war.and second by the general
assembly.
The council of war was organized December 10, 1776, with
a membership consisting or the governor, deputy-governor and eight
others. They or any five of them were fully empowered to transact all
rmatters for the well-being and security of" that "state and the
CJnited States in general." They had full charge of the array raised
and to be raised; and all rules made and passed during the recess of
lithe assembly hpcl full force as though made and passed by their gen-
6
jeral assembly, nerein is evidence of little exclusive authority for
the governor over the military forces, ilor was this curtailment all.
—
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"It is a misfortune," s? id Colonel dalraedy in a letter to General Leeu
December 20, 1776, "in a government, when military affairs are in the
1
hands of a legislative authority."
notwithstanding tho fact that the governor oould exercise
very little pov/er over military affairs, he did, during the time the
British occupied Rhode Island, give considerable service to his
state in keeping General 7/ashington informed about existing condi-
2 2
tions. He also fortified Bewport, and v/ith consent of the assembly,
(organized the alarm list into a company and commissioned its offic-
4
era*
Considerable criticism has been passed on Rhode Island,
Massachusetts and Hew Hampshire ror the lack of support that they ren
-
dered the American army after the scene of action was transferred
from Hew England. A letter of General Greene's of January 23, 1777,
to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island expresses very frankly the feeling
he had towards the Hew Englanders. He says, "I must confess I did not
expect to find the Americans such slaves to contingencies; but more
especially Hew England, and in particular, Rhode Island. Such a de-
pression of spirit under misfortunes, and elevation upon successes
betrays a want of principle and rortitude, that I would fain rlatter
myself were the foundation of our opposition I am very sorry to
hear of the distraction and confusion that prevails in your councils
and public measures. The liberality v/ith which you confer favors on
some, and fix stigmas on others, must make men of real merit somewhat
cautious now they put themselves in a situation where they may oe
1. Ehode Island Records, viii. 164.
2. Ibid., viii. 112.
2. Ibid., vii. 508-9.
4. Ibid., viii. 67.
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rendered from the highest pitch of glory to the lowest state of con-
tempt. It was ever the policy of the Romans to be cautious whom they
1
trusted, and now tncy disgraced those they had once honored."
Although Pennsylvania was a quaker state; and a feeling of
opposition to war strongly existed among a large per cent. of its in-
habitants; yet the president and council were very vigorous in their
actions with the militia. The legislature freely made statutory pro-
visions empowering the executive to organise and officer troops, to
seise and impress wagons, to provide food, clothing and ammunition.
Twice in 1777, the president marshalled the militia to defend the
2
state against the approach of the enemy. Then ap-ain in 1780, he was
3
given increased power to form volunteers into a regiment: a right
4
which he exercised in 1781, when the crisis was near.
In South Carolina, the governor with little constitutional
control over military affairs, was finally given much power during
the period that the Revolutionary war was carried on in the South.
5
Rut ledge with almost dictatorial power managed the American cause
with such care and success, that the enemy realised that his capture
meant more towards their success than the capture of any other man
6
in South Carolina.
In Uorth Carolina, the Board of T.Var that was established
during the threatening days in the South, so hampered the governor
7
that his influence over the war was little felt. As early as 1776
— o
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and 1777, he did, however, exorcise some slight authority in appoint-
1
ing some Tew military officers , in dictating as to the disposition
2 3
of prisoners, and in sending relief to South Carolina.
In none of the states did the executive exercise quite so
much power and authority over the troops in hi3 state, as in Virginia.
In the same measure that Rhode Island and Horth Carolina may toe taken
as types of weak executive military control, Virginia may toe taken
as a type of strong executive control over military affairs.
Shortly after Patrick Henry took his seat as chief magistrat
of Virginia, the General Assembly raised three battalions of infantry
and declared them subject to the laws and regulations established by
the Continental Congress. But Congress had passed an act declaring
no "sentence of a general court martial shall be put in execution till
after a report thereof shall be made to Congress, or to the commander-
in-chief of the forces of the United States," The Virginia assembly
doubted whether Congress had control over its state troops when not
joined with the Continental troops. Consequently, in May, 1777, an
act was passed to the effect that the three battalions , and all other
troops raised at the expense of and for the defence of Virginia
should be under the control of the governor with the advice and
4
consent of the council.
In the same session, at the request of Governor Henry a
5
draft act was passed in order to complete six additional regiments.
The governor hesitated to resort to the use of the draft; but in
— o--
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November of 1777, ho was called upon to detach from the 3tate mili-
tia an aid not exceeding 5000 men. In order to fill the depleted
ranks a bounty was offered to every volunteer. Yet this did not fill
1
I
the ranks and the use of the draft was made.
When General Howe appeared on the Virginia coast. Governor
Q
Henry collected and arrayed a large body of defensive troops, among
which was one company composed of students of V/illi-am and i^ary College
commanded by Reverend James uladison, President of the College. In
order to prevent the enemy getting any information about these troops,
certain persons suspected of being unfriendly to the American cause
4
were "removed and restrained*"
This was the time for action on the part of the Americans.
Howe had passed on towards Philadelphia; and Washington had issued a
call to the states for troops with which to combat the enemy. Govern-
or Henry felt the need of his own forces in Virginia, and wrote,
October 29, to General V/ashington, that "the Regiment of Artillery
commanded by Colonel Charles Harrison is yet in this State. They have
been detained here, under leave of Congress to do Duty at Portsmouth
and York, near which Places the line cay's Ships of 7<ar have been long
hovering. At present seven Man of V/ar and three largo Transports or
provision Vessels, are in and near Hampton Road. The Troops of the
State are so few, that the Defence of our iJaritime Places will be
precarious in the absence of that Regiment.
"I trouble you with this, entrusting you will be pleased
--0--
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to toll rao whether that Regiment will be a desirable aid to you."
'"hen Howe evaouated Philadelphia and the war was trans-
ferred to the South, a proposal was made to withdraw the armed ships
so very necessary for the protection of the commerce of Virginia,
Governor Henry applied to Congress Deceraoer 4, 1778, for naval re-
sistance and showed how necessary it was to protect Chesapeake Bay,
for in so doing Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and Eorth Carolina
would be protected. Congress granted his request and left him the
necessary naval aid which proved its worth in the summer of 1779, in
defending the coast against Sir George Collier and General i^atthews.
In the following year, when the enemy were having what seem-
ed success in the South and were advancing north towards Virginia,
jithe General Assembly passed an act "That the Governor with the advice!
Hof Council, shall have full pov/er, and he is hereby required, if need;
he, to call into actual service .... any number of the militia not
4
!|exceeding 20000 men including those already in service." Governor
Jefferson took advantage of this and all other laws that granted him
military power. He issued no less than ten circular letters from
January 2, 1781, to Jay 8, of the same year, commanding the county
5
lieutenants to assemble forces to meet the enemy. The governor
Isought also to defeat the enemy by reducing the ranks; and in order
to do this Jefferson, on February 5, 1781, issued the following
proclamation to the foreigners: "Cur enemies had thought fit not only
to invite our troops to desert our service, but to compel our citizens
--0--
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falling into their hands to serve against their country. Congress did
resolve, that tnese states would receive all such foreigners who
should leave the armies of his Britannic Majesty, in America and
should chuse to Decorae members of any of these states, and that they
should oe protected in the free exercise of their respective reli-
gions, invested with the rights, privileges, and immunities of nativejs
as Established by the laws of these States, and moreover that they
would provide for every such Person 50 acres of un-appropriated Lands
in some of these States to be held by him and his heirs in aosolute
property.
"I therefore have thought fit by and with the advice of the
Council of State, to issue this my Proclamation, hereby notifying
more generally the said Engagement of Congress, and further promising
to all such foreigners, who snail leave the armies of his Britannic
Majesty while in this state, and repair forthwith to me at this offic
that day shall receive from this Commonwealth a further donation of
two Cows and an exemption during the present V.'ar from all taxes,
....military Service, and shall receive a full compensation
1
for any arms and accoutrements."
With the weight of the war bearing heavily upon him, Thomas
|
Jefferson resigned tne govcrnsnip June 21, 1781, in the eve of the
crisis. The General Assembly then turned to Thomas lelscm as their
choice to carry the burdens; but he, too, felt the oppression, and
within a month after the surrender of Comwallis, resigned from the
office of governor of Virginia.
There was one other factor with which the Americans had to
-
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deal while fighting for freedom - the Indians. As early as the rail
Ox 177b, the English had plunned to strike the southern seaboard and
1
at "cne same rime have the Indians attack the frontier. The putting
into effect these plans was not attempted until tiie following year.
Governor Henry so successfully managed the campaign against the
enemy that the seaboard attack was repulsed. This had a telling ef-
fect on the Indians in the way of weakening them and finally defeat-
ing them. On January 1~ , 1777 , the governor and council appointed a
committee to treat with the Cherokees. This committee, on May 25,
reported that they had arranged terms of a treaty and had brought
with them several Cherokee Chiefs to complete it. This was done, at
the direction of the general assembly, by the governor and Council,
June 26, 1777."
A few years l?>.ter under Jefferson's administration, the
Indians again caused so much distress on the frontiers that the gov-
ernor was forced to take steps to suppress the uprisings. This he did
by issuing circular letters to the lieutenants of Hampshire , Freder-
ick and Berkeley counties to strike against the savages in their own
field. The last two counties failed to respond, and a second eircu-
4
lar letter was issued.
Pennsylvania experienced practically the same treatment
from the hands of the savages in 1781, that Virginia did the year be-
fore. The English had aroused the Indians to commit such atrocious
depredations that the supreme executive council of Pennsylvania sent
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1
five companies to the scenes or distress and quelled their uprisings.
In 1783 the Horth Carolina General Assembly enacted that
the governor should cause a treaty to be held with the Chiokamawga
and Over-Hill Cherokees of the middle and valley settlements. The
governor was also empowered to give the Indians muskets and ammunition
,
and to issue warrants on the treasurer for a sum not to exceed 25C0
|
pounds specie to oe used in purchasing goods for the Indians. In the
treaty that was made the Indians ceded considerable territory to the
state. It was also stipulated that the governor should transact his
business with the Indians by means of messages, Futherraore , no per-
son could trade with the Indians without a license from the governor
2
granting that permission.
14. The Power of the Lxecutives in Financial Affairs.
The rights which the executives exercised over the finan-
cial affairs of their respective states were prescribed in five of
!!the state constitutions. In Hew Hampshire, "Ho monies could he issued
font of the treasury of the state and disposed of (except such as had
been appropriated for the redemption of bills of credit or treasurer's
notes, or for the payment of interest arising thereon) but by warrant
under the nand of the president by and with the advice and consent of
3 4 5
the council." The constitutions of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
6 7
Delaware and ITorth Carolina were very similar to Hew Hampshire in
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this respect. All the other states had to rely on the willingness of
the legislative oodies to enact such measures as would give their
'executives some power over the monies to Do paid out of the public
treasury. Patrick Eenry, in writing to lidmund Pendleton, speaker of
the house of delegates, December b
,
1776, made inquiry as to the
exact extent or nis power to draw upon the treasury. He said, "As by
the act of government it is directed that the governor with the ad-
vice of the privy council shall exercise the executive Powers of Gov-
ernment , a Doubt arises whether tne Governor alone may issue a war-
rant upon the Treasury for the Payment of any on accounts certified
by tne Commissioners. From experience it is found impracticable to
attend to many matters of consequence to the safety of the state, if
the Council are, not only to advise the issuing of Y/arrants upon such
Certificates, But also to keep He cords of the same. We think it prop-
er to acquaint the General Assembly with these our Sentiments; and
v/e beg leave earnestly to recommend, it to their consideration,
whether it would not be to the advantage of the State if Commission-
ers were empowered rinally to transact this Business, or some other
regular mode adopted for the future settling & passing the accounts
1
against the State." Governor Henry's duties in connection with
financial matters were certainly onerous, for the Executive Journal
of his first year covers Tour hundred twenty-four large folio pages
not including correspondence. By far the greater part of the Journal
is filled with entries of claims against the State, for which war-
2
rants were ordered to De issued.
The financial problem was one of the greatest that the
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states Had to solve; tor there was no money except specie thet had
lany thing like a rixed value. Both the paper money, issued Dy all the
states, and the Dills or credit, put out Dy many of tnora, depreciated
,
as the following laoles show:
Depreciation of currency in Connecticut
T
1777
.
-«••••
1778 T
li'fi'r*-1'.*im-fffVtft*inFiV"
1779
January
LFebruary
March
April
May-
June
July
August
1.60 6.97
il. 66-1. 71 7.89
at par
1.06
1.12
1.18
1.24
ii.so
September |l»36
October 1.42
lovember 1.48
December 1.54
2.00
2.26
^2.57
•2.90
3.28
3.72
4.22
4.78
5.42
I
8.94
10.14
11.48
IS. 00
14.17
16.67
18.86
21.27
j 24.22
ijl7_..4iL
! 1780
pi. 12
£5.50
40.00
1
— —
1. Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, iii. 23,

Depreciatioa of Currency in Pennsylvania.
— .
1777 1778 i77y
1 f
170U 1781 1782
t) <± 11 11til j 1.0 8.0 40 .5
TP A 11 fl T* T i • i> 10 .0 47.5
iiiiarcxi 2 .0 5 10 .
5
61.5
April 23*3 w 17 .0 61.5
May £•0 5 24.0 59.0
June o c2*0 4 20.0 61.5
|
17 r\2 .0 4. 19.0 G4.5
AU£US
b
3 . 5 20 .0
1 .
oepuemoer .0 5 24.0
4* /*\ t> "v»uo to uer ri f\.0 5 1 30.0
i< ovemuei 3.0 6 ! 38.5
1
December 4.0. .j £n .41.5
2
Depreciation of Currency in Hprth Carolina.
January at par t 3.50 6.00 32 210 800
February at par 3.50 6.50 35 225 SCO
iiarch
April
1.25 C.75 7.50 40 .
50
250 800
1.5 4.00 10.00 260 800
1.5
|
4. CO 10.00 60 300 800
June 1.75 4.00 12.25
!
75 350 800
July 2 4. CO 15. CO 90 400 800
August 2.125 4.25 18.00
j
100 500
550
: 800
September 2.25 4.25 21.00 j 125 800
October 2.5 4.75 . 25.00 150 600 800
November 2.5 5.00 27.00 175 675 800
D.e.cem.Q.fc.r
.
h 5.&Q
.
' 30.00
....Lm 725 aoc
\m Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, z. 236.
2. Uortli Carolina Records, xiciv. 485.
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Depreciation of Currency in Virginia.
T nr>nXI t I T *J H D 1 1 (3 1 7M1
January 1.5 4 8 42 75
February 1.5 5 10 45 80
March 2.0 5 10 50 90
April 5 16 60 100
May 2.5 5 20 65 150
June 2.5 5 20 65 250
July %i .0 5 21 70 400
August s.o 5 22 72 500
September 3.0 5 24 73 600
October 3.0 5 28 74 700
November S.O 56 74 800
December \ 4.0 6 JL j§D 75
J 1000
The paper money issued by Congress also, was unstable. All
the troops had to be paid and munitions of war to be purchased. Who
was to do this - that was the question. At no time could the Con-
tinental Congress do more than demand that forces be raised and pro-
visions be supplied by tne respective states. The executives, con-
sequently, oy virtue of the constitutional and statutory powers given
there, purchased supplies and paid for them by issuing orders on the
treasuries. The power to issue these warrants differed somewhat
among the various states. For instance, in Ithode Island the Assembly
first requested the issuing of the instruments which the governor
put into execution; while in Pennsylvania the president in council
||had complete control of the withdrawing of money from the treasury.
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During the war, however, thero had been 3orae infringements upon these
rights of the executive, with the result that a law was passed in
1
1785 allowing no money to oc paid out of the state treasury without
the president's consent. In South Carolina the governor had no con-
2
stitutional right whatever to order funds from the treasury. All
warrants had to originate in the house of representatives and receive
the approval of the senate before the treasurer could honor them.
Cot only did the presidents, governors and councils have a
large control over the monies that left the treasuries, but they also
had considerable supervision over the sale of estates and the grant-
3
ing of pensions. In Llassachusetts
,
Pennsylvania and Virginia acts wer^
passed putting into the hands of their executives the estates of
traitors, and others that ha'd been forfeited. These were to be sold
by the governors, and the proceeds to be turned into the respective
state treasuries In some states, too, at the close of the war, the
iistribution of lana grants, promised by Congress and the states to
those who had rendered service in the army, was left to the executive;
Virginia and Pennsylvania were two that conferred upon their chief
naeristrates not only the distribution of the lands to the soldiers,
4
out also the payment of pensions through commissioners, who were
subject to executive control.
In addition to the grants of land and pensions, education
knd the building of roads occupied part of the executive's time.
Massachusetts prescribed in its constitution that the legislature and
jnagistrates should cherish the interests of literature and science in
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all grammar and public schools and seminaries, ;nd especially in the
1
University at Camuridge. In Pennsylvania the old University of
Pennsylvania had been founded upon free religious principles; but Dy
a vote of zhe trustees in 1764, was altered from the plan of the
originators. The Assembly then passeu an act to confirm the estates
and interests of the college, academy and charitable institutions of
Philadelphia, and to amend and alter the charter so as to conform to
the revolution and constitution of Pennsylvania and to erect the old
institution into a university. In order to support this institution,
it was enacted chat the "Supreme Executive Council, reserve such and
so many of the confiscated estates yet unsold and unappropriated as
to them shall appear necessary in order to create a certain fund for
the maintenance of the provost, vice-provost, master and assistants,
and to uphold and preserve the charitable schools of the said uni-
2
versity." In 1782 Dicinson College was established, and in 1786, the
supreme executive council was empowered to draw upon the treasury for
funds necessary for surveying lands for this school and the Pittsburg
Z
academy.
The westward movement was reaching such proportions that
there was a demand for better roads and ferries. This demand, after
tne war, brought forth legislation that gave to the Virginia governor
and tne Pennsylvania president power to appoint commissioners to lay
out and improve roads and construct ferries along the most frequent-
ly traveled routes; and to draw on the treasury for funds necessary
to make these improvements. Yet, the states as a whole felt that
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little could be done ; because there still hung over them the great
war debt and the dangers or an unstable form of government. Therefore
they felt that ^ne next step wa3 to provide some system of govern-
ment which should place the nation on an equal footing with other
free countries. There was need, it seemed to them, for a legislative
body to make laws and ror another to enforce them.
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CHAPTEB V.
THE STATE EXECUTIVE A3 A PRECEDENT FOR THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE
.
One of the greatest confessions of distrust in the state
constitutions that tne delegates to the constitutional convention
made was the conferring of executive power on one man, the president.
The same thing is no less true of the state conventions in tneir
adoption of the federal constitution. "The colonial executives had
seldom won and never held public confidence. They had strained at
1
their official Donas, ana at times broken them." The states in tneir
original governmental plans had felt that they dared not run any risk
of executive usurpation. As their defence they provided for the short
term, nigh property qualifications, the limited authority and the
ineligibility of the governor to succeed himself for any great length
of time. In these supposed safeguards "che people tnought themselves
free from the domineering powers which the provincial governors
exercised. T.7hen the Federal convention took up the task of planning
for a national executive, providing a method of electing him, fixing
his term and naming his powers and duties, it was perfectly natural
that Lhe delegates rrom the various states should name their state
executives as precedents. Although the plan of having a one-man
executive found ravor with a large majority of the delegates; such
an agreement was not reacned, nowever, without considerable debate.
Some of tne delegates wished the executive to consist of one man,
others of three, and still others wished the number to De unfixed;
while Elgridge Gerry, of Massachusetts , maintained tnat tne cnief-
2
magistrate should have an executive council. The idea of executive's
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being elected by the national congress found example in the state
constitutions of Pennsylvania 1776, Maryland 1776, IJorth Carolina
1776 and 1773, Virginia 1776 and Georgia 1777, eight constitutions
in all. James V/ilson of Pennsylvania maintained in the convention
that "This subject nas greatly divided the House, and will also
divide the people out of doors. It is in truth, the most difficult
of all on wnich we nave nad to aecido." He was from the first for
tne election of the executive by the people as was the method in
1
Massachusetts and Hew York. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
,
strange
to say, did not favor this plan, but proposed that the chief magis-
trate be elected by the governors and presidents of the states, by
and with the advice of tne councils, and where there were no councils,
2
by electors chosen for that purpose. In all the states that provided
for a Senate, this oody was elected by the people except in Maryland,
wnere tncy were cnosen by electors selected for that purpose alone.
This is prooaoly the precedent that finally won the favor of the con-
vention. In case there should not be a majority for any on candidate
for the presidency, the convention found a remedy in the Massachu-
setts form of government, which provided that if "no person shall
nave a majority of votes, the nouse of representatives shall by bal-
lot, elect two out of four persons wno nad the nighest number of
votes, if so many shall have been voted for; but, if, otherwise, out
of the number voted for; and raaice return to the senate of the two
persons so elected; on wnich the senate shall proceed, by oallot, to
5
elect one, wno shall oe governor."
—
o--
1. James Harvy Eobinson, in "Annals oi' the American Academy,"
v. 225.
2. Gaillard Hunt, "The 7/ritings of James Madison," iv. 59.
Constitution of Massachusetts , Part ii«, Chap.ii., Sect. i.
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Y/hen it came to fixing the length of the term, noger oher-
man who advocated the tnree yeur icrra, found only one state, Dela-
ware, in wnich tne governor was elected for that length of time,
j There were, however, no seven year terras such as the convention at
first proposed, in any of the states except that several of them
allowed their magistrates ;o De reelected for any number of years.
For a precedent of the vice-presidency the convention
turned to Delaware and Hew Jersey where the officer next oelow the
president was called vice-president, and to l^outh Carolina, Mass-
achusetts and Hew York where in each cane there was a lieutenant-
governor, in the last state elected as was the governor.
The question of giving to tne president a veto power was
one that caused considerable discussion and one in which the con-
vention round good examples in Massachusetts and ITcw York. In the
former, tne exact reading of the constitution has a marked similar-
ity to the veto clause in the Federal Constitution. For instance,
"Ho bill or resolve of the senate or nouse of representatives, shall
become a law, ana in rorce as such, until it shall have been laid
before the governor for nis revisai; and if ne, upon such revision,
approve thereof, he shall signify his approbation by signing the
same. But if he have any objections to the passing of such bill or
resolve, he shall return the same, together with his objections there
to, in writing, to the senate or house of representatives in which-
soever the same shall nave originated; who shall enter the objections
sent down by the governor, at large on their records, and proceed to
reconsider the said Dill or resolv§. But if, after such consideration,
two thirds of the said senate or house of representatives shall, not-
withstanding the said objections, agree to pass the same, it shall.
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together with the objections, dc sont to the other branch of the
legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered ; and If approved by
two thirds or the members present, it shall have the force of a law.
But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined
by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons voting for or against
j
the said bill or resolve shall be entered upon the public records of I
the commonwealth."
The plan of giving the president appointive power was not
new; for all the governors had much power to make military and
judicial appointments, but they were given little right to make civil
appointments. The association of the Senate with the president in the;
jlexercise of the appointive powers is strikingly similar to the system
used in Hew York under the constitution of 1777. Ihere, the executive,
free to act alone in all other respects was bound to make appoint-
2
ments "by and with the consent of a select committee of the senate."
When, however, the federal convention presented the constitution of
the United States for adoption, the limitations to the president's
appointive power were so very few, it made the similar powers of the
state executives appear more curtailed than they really were.
While many of the president's powers can be plainly seen in
some degree in all the state executive powers; yet no one state could I
lay a claim to any great nucber of precedents established by its con-li
'stitution.
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COHCLUSIOH.
In the transition from provinces to commonwealths , while the
plans of government were being formed a great change was made in the
powers of the executives. Previous to the Involution the governors
were possessed with numerous rights of which they were shorn in the
various states upon the adoption of state constitutions. The Council
became a potent check in the administrative affairs. The assemblies
still controlled financial affairs to a very large extent and made
the governor merely an auditor. They freely enacted laws over which
he had no direct negative except in iiassachuset ts . He did, however,
exercise some authority over appointments and considerable power over
the state military and naval forces, "but not without the consent of the
council, in most cases.
Because of the bitter experience with the provincial
governors, the framers of the constitutions endeavored to curtail the
powers and duties of the executives; and they succeeded too well. The ;
weaknesses of the various state constitutions were soon discovered;
and before the close of the century the majority of the states had
new forms of government in operation.
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